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CONVEYANCING IN NEW YORK
Lester Nelsont
Conveyancing law and operations as they exist in most states in the
country have recently been the subject of much criticism.1 Charac-
terized as slow, wasteful and incompatible with contemporary standards
of business, the call for reform has issued. In response, some states have
enacted corrective legislation which, it is hoped, will resuscitate the in-
firm system.2
New York during the last sixty years has witnessed the modernization
and streamlining of many areas of the law.' However, the law of real
property has not received the attention devoted to other legal subjects.
The object of this paper is to evaluate the present law of property in
New York as it affects conveyancing in order to determine whether new
legislation is warranted.
Unfortunately, no quantitative scale has been devised by which we
can measure precisely the effectiveness of the law of property. But
we can formulate the criteria of a desirable and efficient conveyancing
system which, when applied to that existing in New York, will enable
us to appraise its success. For this purpose the following four criteria
are established; to the extent the New York system of conveyancing
fails to satisfy them reform is needed:
I - Security of ownership and possession predicated upon public
records.
II - Extinction of ancient claims to free titles of socially useless
impairments.
III - Freedom from all formal defects and irregularities in the records
of land transactions to eliminate captious attacks on titles.
IV - Uniformity of the standards of marketable title to simplify the
transfer of land.
t See -Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 659, for biographical data.
1 John C. Payne has collected excerpts from the plethora of such criticism in "The Crisis
in Conveyancing," 19 Mo. L. Rev. 214 n.1 (1954). He summarizes the situation as follows:
"it is more and more apparent that the system employed in [sic) clumsy, wasteful,
inefficient and out of keeping with our demands for social institutions of reasonable effec-
tiveness, and there is general agreement among competent, disinterested observers that
conventional procedures, if left unmodified, will soon break down of their own weight."
2 E.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 1207 (1935); Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 26.1271-79 (1948); Neb. Rev.
Stat. §§ 76.601-44 (1943).
3 Reform has, to cite two examples, been accomplished in the fields of procedure (Civil
Practice Act, 1920); and commercial law (e.g., Negotiable Instruments Law, 1897); Condi-
tional Sales Act, 1922; Retail Installment Sales Act, 1957. This is not to suggest that
these areas of law are perfect, or that changes may not profitably be enacted.
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I.
TITLE SECURITY AND PUBLIc RECORDS
The purchaser of a parcel of property expects that upon receipt
of the deed tendered him, he will be secure in his title and possession
and be able to establish its marketability in the event that he desires
to sell. If inexperienced in such matters, he will assume that the existing
conveyancing system provides these advantages as a matter of public
record and at no great expense. Legitimate as these expectations may
be, our prospective property owner will, unfortunately, be disappointed.
Should he obtain any assurance with respect to his title, it will be at
a substantial expense and it will not generally be a matter of public
record. Indignation may well characterize his reaction, and he may
question the value of a conveyancing system that does not accomplish
such seminal purposes.
If such a purchaser resides in New York there are three primary
methods available to him by which he can attempt to secure the title
he has acquired: Title registration, title insurance, and an attorney's
title opinion and abstract. The relative cost, extent of protection of
title, and public nature of the records for each of these methods will
be examined in this section in an effort to learn how well the existing
law of New York satisfies the first objective of an effective conveyancing
system.
A. Title Registration
Making the ownership and transfer of real property as simple and
uncomplicated as the ownership and transfer of personal property has
been the goal of many writers on this subject,4 and has provided the
original inspiration for the development of the system known as title
registration by Sir Richard Torrens in Australia in 1858. The Torrens
System, as it is popularly known, found immediate favor and was soon
adopted in many parts of the world.6 From 1890 through 1930 there
was great enthusiasm for the system in this country, as is evidenced by
the enactment of title registration statutes in a number of states.7 And
by an act adopted in 1908,8 New York authorized the registration
of titles within the state.
4 See, e.g., 4 American Law of Property § 17.38 (Casner ed. 1952); Spies "A Critique
of Conveyancing," 38 Va. L. Rev. 245 (1952); Note, "A Comparison of Land and Motor
Vehicle Registration," 48 Yale LJ. 1238 (1939).
5 For references on the history of the Torrens System, see the bibliography in Powell,
Registration of the Title to Land in the State of New York 295-314 (1938) (hereinafter
cited as Powell).
6 Id. at 56-73.
7 Id. at 54.
8 N.Y. Real Prop. Law §§ 370-435.
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Briefly, the procedure established in New York to register a title
requires the commencement of a judicial proceeding which is in the
nature of an action in rem to quiet title.9 If the court is satisfied from
the official examiner's report of title0 that the petitioner has title free
from reasonable doubt 1' it will issue a final order or judgment to that
effect.' 2 Such final order " . . . shall . . . be forever binding and con-
clusive upon the state of New York and all persons in the world. .. ."
despite the fact that persons bound may be under a disability because of
infancy or incompetency.13 At the time a certified copy of the final order
is filed with the county registrar a certificate of title setting forth all
outstanding interests in the registered property is prepared 4 and kept
on file in a title book,15 and a duplicate thereof is issued to the owner.' 6
Upon registration, the owner is also required to contribute one-tenth
of one per cent of the value of his property to an assurance fund against
which any person who, without negligence, has sustained a loss as a result
of the registration of the property may file a claim. 17 In the event the
property is transferred the grantor must, of course, execute and deliver
a deed to the grantee, and in addition, he must surrender his duplicate
title certificate to the registrar, who will issue a new certificate to the
grantee.18
Despite the logic and seeming advantages of this system'9 in providing
a maximum of security predicated upon public records, there can be no
doubt that it has not succeeded in New York.0 Since the effective date
of the statute, only about 350 base registrations have been made in the
City of New York, presently affecting approximately 1,000 parcels of
property.-"
9 Id. § 371.
10 Id. § 380.
1 Id. § 391.
12 Id. § 390.
'3 Id. § 391; however see § 400 which provides four limited exceptions against which a
title certificate is not conclusive: (1) liens and claims arising under the laws or Constitution
of the United States which are not required to be of record; (2) taxes, water rates or
assessments imposed after initial registration; (3) lease not exceeding one year; and
(4) easements and servitudes created after initial registration.
14 Id. §§ 393-94.
15 Id. § 395.
16 Id. § 396.
17 Id. §§ 426-28.
18 Id. § 406.
'. A compelling statement of the virtues of title registration is made by McDougal and
Brabner-Smith, "Land Title Transfer: A Regression," 48 Yale L.J. 1125 (1939).
20 For an evaluation of the operation of the Torrens System in New York, see Powell
4-53. Prof. Powell's arguments against title registration are effectively answered by
McDougal and Brabner-Smith, supra note 19, and by Fairchild and Springer, "A Criticism
of Powell's Book," 24 Cornell L.Q. 557 (1939).
21 These statistics were obtained from conversations held with the clerk in charge of
title registration in the Office of the Registrar of the City of New York. The most important
area in the city affected by title registration is the Seaview Village Development in Brooklyn,
the title of which was registered in the thirties.
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The experience of New York in this respect is not unique. Although
title registration is used to a greater extent in some areas of the country
than others,2 2 in general, it has not been extensively adopted in any
state.23 Nor does it appear that there is any tendency for an increased
use of the system as time progresses.24
Three primary reasons are attributed to the public's rejection of the
Torrens System: (1) the cost and difficulty of initial registration; (2) the
inconclusiveness of the certificate; and (3) the attack upon the system
by title insurance companies, abstractors and lawyers, who believe their
economic interests would be adversely affected by its success.
Prof. Powell,25 after analyzing the relative cost26 (in 1938) of register-
ing a title as compared to the cost of title insurance and of a title ab-
stract, concludes that title registration is by far the most expensive of
the three systems considered. A reply to Prof. Powell indicates that his
analysis is fallacious in certain respects 2 7 After conducting a compara-
tive study of relative costs, the authors of the reply are of the opinion
that title registration is cheaper than title insurance for properties valued
above $5,000. Prof. Powell, himself, concedes that the sale of a regis-
tered title is less expensive than obtaining a new policy of title insurance
for the same property,2 since only a nominal fee is required to be paid to
effectuate the transfer of the title certificate,29 while title companies
charge the original premium on the re-issue of a title policy to a new
owner.
Both the individual landholder who acquires property which has
been previously registered and the community at large receive eco-
nomic benefits from registered titles.30 But, unfortunately, the person
who bears the cost of the initial registration will usually not be too
22 See 4 American Law Property § 17.30 n.11 (Casner ed. 1952). E.g., in Massachusetts
the total number of registrations up to December 31, 1950, is 22,659; in Cook County,
Illinois (Chicago) during the period 1941-50, 3,028 titles were registered.
23 Powell 55.
24 Within the past twenty years not more than twelve titles were registered in the City
of New York. California, one of the states in which title registration was used extensively,
has recently repealed its statute. Cal. Stats. 1955, c. 332.
25 Powell 48.
26 The items of expense incurred in the registration of a title include: (1) contribution
to the State Assurance Fund of one-tenth of 1% of the assessed valuation of the parcel of
property registered, N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 426; (2) payment to the Official Examiner of
Title, $20 plus one-tenth of 1% of the assessed valuation of the property registered, id.
§ 432(n); (3) payment of miscellaneous fees, id. § 432; (4) cost of the survey required,
id. § 381; and (5) attorneys' fees for conducting the registration proceedings.
27 McDougal and Brabner-Smith, supra note 19, at 1139. The alleged error in Prof.
Powell's statistics is that he includes the expense of fees and of a survey in the costs for
title registration, while omitting them from the costs of title insurance, although a purchaser
would probably incur the same expenses under both systems.
28 Powell 52.
29 The fee for a transfer certificate is $6, N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 432(d).
30 See McDougal and Brabner-Smith, supra note 19, at 1142.
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concerned over the prospective savings he has gained for a subsequent
purchaser. To more evenly divide the cost of registration, the initial
expense to the registrant could be reduced and the differential in cost
recovered for the state by a pro rata tax imposed on each subsequent
owner.31 Alternatively, if the Torrens System were adequately accepted
by the public, registration of a title might be considered in the nature
of a capital expenditure which would increase the value of the property;
upon resale, the initial registrant would recover the costs of the registra-
tion proceedings.
Inertia is both a law of physics and of human behavior; and the neces-
sity for commencing a judicial proceeding in order to register a title un-
doubtedly discourages many landowners. In addition, it adds sig-
nificantly to the cost thereof. Consequently, if registration could be
accomplished by a simple administrative procedure which would avoid
the necessity for a plenary action, the public might be more attracted to
it.
3 2
Title registration has been further reproved with the allegation that
the holder of a registered title has gained little security for his efforts
since the title certificate is not conclusive against all outstanding inter-
ests.3 3 Though this allegation may be true under the laws of other
states,34 there is no doubt that in New York the words of the legislature35
in imparting absolute conclusiveness to the certificate have been en-
forced by the courts.36 This is not to say that cases cannot arise in
which a certificate might have to be set aside, 37 but for practical pur-
poses, in New York this objection to title registration has no validity.
It is generally agreed that the greatest obstacle title registration has
had to overcome in order to gain general acceptance-an obstacle which
it has been unable to meet-is the opposition of those groups whose
economic lives are threatened by it.3 Until recently, many lending
3' Id. at 1150. See also Johnstone "Title Insurance," 66 Yale L.J. 492, 515 (1957) (herein-
after cited as Johnstone).
32 See Note, "A Comparison of Land and Motor Vehicle Registration," 48 Yale L.J.
1238 (1939). But cf. People ex rel. Kern v. Chase, 165 Ill. 527, 46 N.E. 454 (1896), which
declared title registration by an administrative agency to be unconstitutional, as an illegal
grant of judicial power. This case, however, was decided prior to the advent of administra-
tive law on the American scene as a significant agency of government. See Conn. Mutual
L. Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541, 547 (1948); Twin Falls Canal Co. v. Huff, 58 Idaho
587, 76 P.2d 923 (1938); Clark v. Briscoe Irr. Co., 200 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
33 See Note, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 945 (1929).
34 See Powell, Supplement A, 111 5-12 at 92-96, conclusiveness of a title certificate in
Calif.; in Minnesota, Supplement G, 111 7-11 at 204-05; in Oregon Supplement L, ff 3 at 250.
35 N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 391.
36 City of New York v. Wright, 243 N.Y. 80, 152 N.E. 472 (1926); Hunt v. Hay, 214
N.Y. 578, 108 N.E. 851 (1915); see also Powell 33.
37 See Minnetonka State Bank v. Minnesota State Sunshine Society, 189 Minn. 560, 250
N.W. 561 (1933) (two inconsistent outstanding certificates of title); Baart v. Martin, 99
Minn. 197, 108 N.W. 945 (1906) (title certificate set aside because of fraud).
358 McDougal and Brabner-Smith, supra note 19, at 1147, summarize the situation in
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institutions which insist on financing only insured titles have been
unwilling to make loans secured by real property which was registered,
since no title insurance company would be willing to insure such titles.
As a result the owners of registered lands have been denied the usual
commercial advantages of property ownership.3 9
Furthermore, the registrar, unlike title insurance companies, is unable
to advertise the advantages of the statutory system of title registration;
consequently, the public is dependent upon members of the bar and real
estate brokers to provide them with information concerning it. Un-
fortunately, too few attorneys or brokers realize that title registration
exists in New York. Those who are knowledgeable dislike abandoning
comfortable and profitable methods of property transfer in order to
become acquainted with new, less remunerative procedures.40
Advocates of title registration have suggested that only by making
title registration compulsory would there be any extensive use of the
system.4' Registration is compulsory, in whole or in part, in Australia,
England, Ireland, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Canada, Hawaii, the
Philippines and Switzerland,42 and in these jurisdictions it has met
with great success. However, there appears to be little interest in any
reform so radical and its constitutionality is questionable.43
B. Title Insurance
Competing successfully against title registration is the practice of
title insurance which, although predicated upon the existing public rec-
ords, has resulted in each title company preparing, in effect, a private
title certificate on the status of all titles insured.
The need for a system of public records of land titles to prevent
fraudulent claims founded upon undisclosed transactions and to protect
these words: "The chief, major, proximate, and direct cause of the non-use of, or of the
public 'disinclination' to use, the Torrens system has been the bitter, multi-form opposition
-lobbying against any reform, wounding statutes when enactment is inevitable, conspiring
with lending agencies, spreading adverse publicity, and so forth-of title companies and title
lawyers." See also id. at 1147 n.125.
39 See Matter of Cams, 181 Misc. 1047, 1051, 43 N.Y.S.2d 497, 501 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1943). Quite the contrary situation obtains in the Philippines and Hawaii, where title
registration is well established. There the banks prefer to make loans secured by registered
titles. See Patton, "Extension of the Torrens System into Hawaii, the Philippine Islands
and Latin-American Jurisdictions." 36 Minn. L. Rev. 213 (1952).
40 Most title companies give a commission to the attorney or real estate broker represent-
ing the insured based on 15% of the premium paid for the insurance.
41 Fairchild and Gluck, "Various Aspects of Compulsory Land Title Registration," 15
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 545 (1938).
42 Id. at 551.
43 See Anderson v. Shepard, 285 IL. 544, 121 N.E. 215 (1918), in which an fllinois act
requiring that only representatives of decedents' estates register lands was declared unconsti-
tutional. But Fairchild and Gluck, supra note 41, at 561-69, argue that a statute can be
drafted which would not violate the federal or state constitutions; accord, Note, "A
Comparison of Land and Motor Vehicle Registration," 48 Yale L.J. 1238 (1939).
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bona fide purchasers was recognized quite early in the development of
our national legal institutions.44 In response to this need the American
colonists enacted statutes requiring the recording of all transactions in-
volving title to real property.45
As land transactions increased in volume and new interests and liens
in lands were created, it became apparent that many claims to real
property did not appear in the public records. 48 People began to seek
new means by which they could obtain some type of protection against
title losses, and in the last quarter of the nineteenth century the concept
of insuring title to property was conceived." Since then the use of
title insurance by owners and mortgagees has grown rapidly, so that
today some land in every state is insured" by one or more of the 147
title insurance companies in the country authorized to write such
policies.49 The volume of title insurance written varies greatly through-
out the states, with its greatest use occurring on the Pacific coast and in
metropolitan areas.
Presently, there are 13 domestic companies organized to write title
insurance policies in the State of New York.50 During 1956 these com-
panies wrote 185,000 policies insuring $4,220,000,000 worth of prop-
erty." The overwhelming portion of this insurance was on property
located within New York City, Westchester, Nassau or Suffolk counties,
in which areas it is relatively rare for a purchaser of property valued
over $50,000 not to take out title insurance.5"
State control of title insurance company activity was made consider-
ably more stringent after the nineteen-thirties.53 Presently, title com-
44 See Morris, Studies in the History of American Law 69-73 (1930).
45 The earliest recording act, as we know it today, was enacted by the Massachusetts
Bay Colony in 1640. See 4 American Law of Property § 17.4 (Casner ed. 1952); it is
generally acknowledged that the development of recording statutes is unique to America,
although they may have been influenced by certain European practices. Id. § 17.5.
46 The following is a list of some of the matters which can affect title to real property
and for which the recording acts fail to provide notice: ". . . [Fjraud, forgery and false
impersonation, alteration, want of legal delivery, questions of fact, wrongful possession of
a deed, conditional delivery, identity of persons, copyists' errors, minors and others under
a disability, insanity, afterborn children, and pretermitted heirs, void judgments and decrees,
usury, mechanics liens, adverse possession, unrecorded instruments, visible and existing
easements, streams, lakes, rivers, whether land is riparian or nonriparian, and whether new
lands are alluvion, accretion or otherwise, overlapping, and finally exercise of police powers.!
Comment, "Title Insurance in California," 39 Calif. L. Rev. 235, 238-39 (1951).
47 The first title insurance company was organized in Philadelphia, Pa., in 1876. See
Rhodes, "The Insurance of the Real Estate Title," 10 Conn. B.J. 115, 206, 211 (1936).
48 Johnstone, "Title Insurance," 66 Yale L.J. 492, 493 n.5 (1957).
49 Id. at 492.
50 Until recently there were 14 such companies, but during 1957 United Title & Mortgage
Guaranty Co. and Lawyers Mortgage & Title Company merged.
51 These statistics were supplied by the New York State Title Association.
52 The number of policies written in these areas was 173,616, which is 93.850/ of the total
policies issued in the state.
53 During the nineteen thirties, thirty-one of the forty-four title and mortgage guarantee
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panies are required to have a minimum paid-in capital of at least
$250,000, and an initial paid-in surplus equal at least to fifty (50) per
cent of capital.54 Furthermore, they are required to maintain a statutory
minimum reserve55 and their powers are strictly limited.56 Insurance
policy forms,57 rate schedules, classification of risks, and rules as to
commissions to be paid, as well as any changes thereto, must all be
filed with the State Superintendent of Insurance."
An applicant for title insurance is actually purchasing two services
from a title company: (1) examination of the state of title to the sub-
ject property; and (2) insurance against title losses. Critics of title
insurance allege that since all defects appearing in the chain of title
will be excepted from the coverage of the policy,59 the insurance risks
assumed by the title companies are minimal; in effect, they virtually
insure only against the errors of their own employees.60
Title insurance is not written for any fixed period of time but remains
in effect until there is no further risk to the insured. In a fee policy
this occurs when the insured disposes of the property and there is no
further liability under any title covenant. A mortgagee policy, however,
terminates when the mortgage is satisfied or released. Though mortgagee
policies customarily include protection for assignees of the mortgage,
fee policies do not and each subsequent grantee must obtain new in-
surance. Policies generally provide that the insurer will defend or
prosecute any suit affecting the title to the insured premises and will be
liable for specified losses which the insured may sustain as a result of a
defect in title. In New York, title policies usually guarantee that the
insured will be able to convey marketable title except as noted therein.6
Cost of title insurance differs throughout the counties of the state and
is based upon a fixed rate per thousand dollars of insurance. Further-
more, the premium varies, depending upon whether title to a fee, a mort-
companies organized in New York during the period 1920-1930 were required to liquidate.
See Johnstone, 512 n.89.
54 N.Y. Ins. Law § 430.
55 Id. § 434.
56 Id. §§ 432, 436.
57 Id. § 438.
58 Id. § 440.
59 See Johnstone, 494-98, discussing the risks usually covered and excepted from
insurance policies.
60 See Comment "Title Insurance in California," 39 Calif. L. Rev. 235, 247-49 (1951).
The relatively small percentage of losses of title insurance companies compared to losses
of other insurance companies would seem to support the argument that the risks assumed by
title companies are negligible.. For 1956 average percentage of loss to premiums on title
insurance in New York was 6.4%, while on New York life insurance policies it was 33.69,
and on accident and health insurance policies it was 68.4%, and for New York stock fire
insurance policies it was 51.8%. See statistical tables from N.Y. Ins. Report 27, 37, 105,
128, 156 (1957).




gage or a leasehold is being insured. 62 Generally, in New York, insurance
is cheapest for property located in the counties of Bronx, Richmond,
Kings, Queens, Westchester and Nassau; more expensive in New York
and Suffolk Counties, and most expensive in the upstate counties. In
addition to the scheduled premiums, title companies make various ad-
ditional charges for tax searches, surveys and other services.
Outside of the New York City area,6" many of the title companies
use the "approved attorney" system in which a company will insure
property based on the title opinion rendered by an attorney in whom
they have great confidence. The cost of this type of insurance is con-
siderably less than the standard type of policy sold in which the com-
pany examines the title.64
That title insurance is not a completely satisfactory answer to the
problem of securing titles cannot be doubted by disinterested observers.
Its expense, limited insurance coverage, and duplication of public rec-
ords, 65 make it considerably less valuable socially than title registration.
In addition, as a result of the control title companies have over land
transactions in some areas, standards of marketability of title, and real
property law in general, are virtually made by private companies rather
than by public agencies.6 6 Nevertheless, there is little likelihood that
title insurance will be replaced in New York by any other system offer-
ing similar services. And, as has occurred in other industries which
vitally affect the public interest,67 more extensive government regula-
tion may be necessary to make certain, if private competition does not,
that title companies charge fair rates, provide adequate insurance cover-
62 The Title Guarantee & Trust Co., Guaranteed Title & Mortgage Co. and the Home
Title Guaranty Co. are members of the New York Board of Title Underwriters which
fixes standard rates for their members; e.g., rates for fee insurance average about $70 per
thousand dollars in New York County. Other title companies in the state fix their own
rates which are generally 8-10% lower than those rates prescribed for Board members.
Mortgage insurance is cheaper than fee and leasehold insurance, and one wonders what
justification there is for this difference in premiums. Perhaps it may not be best explained
by the bargaining power of the large lending institutions which provide the insurance com-
panies with such a large proportion of this type of business (approximately 80% of the
national non-farm real estate mortgage debt is held by such institutions). See Johnstone,
502.
63 The Lawyer's Title Insurance Corp. was the only title company using the approved
attorney system in New York City until it recently decided to discontinue its use in the City.
64 Generally, insurance sold under this plan costs $5 per thousand, of which the company
pays the approved attorney 25% of the premium instead of the usual 15% commission.
In addition, the attorney will charge the client for the title search.
65 Some title companies maintain complete title plants, i.e., they reproduce for their own
purposes all recorded instruments affecting realty. See Johnstone, 506.
66 See Comment, "Title Insurance in California," 39 Calif. L. Rev. 235, 244 (1951).
67 Life, accident and health insurance companies in New York are subject to greater
regulation than title insurance companies. See N.Y. Ins. Law §§ 190-224, e.g., limitation
of expenses § 212; limitation on accumulation of surplus § 207; misrepresentations are
prohibited § 211. Similar controls are imposed on casualty insurance companies; see N.Y.
Ins. Law §§ 310-33.
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age and are capable of meeting all losses incurred. Title insurance has
now become too important to the community to permit it to continue
without periodic examination of its social responsibility.
C. Title Abstracts and Opinions
The traditional method by which a prospective purchaser of property
ascertains whether the title he is to acquire is unfettered by adverse
claims is by a title abstract and opinion prepared by an attorney after
examination of the public records. In a great many counties of the
state this system is still the predominant method on which purchasers
of property rely for the security of their title. In fact, some law offices
have amassed abstracts of title for a major portion of the properties in
their locality.
Multitudinous land transactions during the years have, however, pro-
duced voluminous records and many attorneys have found title abstract-
ing too laborious and unremunerative a task. To relieve them of this
burden, the title abstractor offers his services to the legal community.
By virtue of peculiar experience and interest, the abstractor is capable
of examining titles more efficiently and less expensively than attorneys.
And based upon the abstract of title submitted to him the attorney pre-
pares the opinion of title.
Obviously, this system offers meager security to the purchaser of
property who has relied thereon. Although the attorney or abstractor
may be liable in contract or tort68 for errors in the opinion or abstract,
such potential liability is not of great value. By the time any adverse
claim is made an individual attorney or abstractor may be deceased or
unable to satisfy any judgment entered against him. Furthermore, too
many claims can be asserted against a title which arise from matters
not of record, so that the title examiner is unable to forewarn his client of
their existence.69
The cost of obtaining an opinion of title is considerably less than title
insurance or title registration,7" but, of course, either of those competing
systems offers greater protection. As is the case with title insurance, each
purchaser of property must obtain a new abstract and title opinion.71
An abstract that satisfies Smith's attorney that title is valid and market-
able may at a later date not meet the requirements of the attorney for
68 See Cole v. Vincent, 229 App. Div. 520, 242 N.Y. Supp. 644 (4th Dep't 1930); 28
A.L.R.2d 891 (1951) ; Patton, Land Titles § 44 (1957).
69 See note 46 supra; for a classic "horror story" of the insecurities of property owner-
ship, see Crocker, "The History of a Title," 22 Minn. L. Rev. 129 (1937).
70 One abstract company in New York City charges $50 for a title abstract of any
parcel of property within the city limits, with the search extending back forty years.
71 In some areas, the seller supplies an abstract of title to the buyer.
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Jones, Smith's vendee. Therefore, the absence of any standards of
marketability is another of the grievous shortcomings of this system.
The systems of conveyancing described above are not unique to New
York, nor are their disadvantages peculiar to it by virtue of special
conditions or laws. If, as is most likely, the public rejection of title
registration continues, security of ownership and certainty of market-
ability based upon public records will only be achieved by changes in
the existing property law. Some such changes are discussed in connec-
tion with the three remaining sections of this paper.72 One important
reform in this regard not mentioned elsewhere is the desirability of
creating a tract index for the land records of every county in the state. 3
Such an index will greatly aid the title examiner in determining what out-
standing claims of record have been filed against the property. The
beginning of such a program has been made for the counties comprising
New York City 4 and Nassau County and its use should be made uni-
form throughout the state.
II.
ELIMINATING STALE CLAIMS
Since the twelfth century actions concerning real estate have been
regulated by statutes of limitation 5 whose service to the public interest
has been recognized as providing the repose and security necessary for
legal transactions. 6 In fact, no modern system of jurisprudence exists
which does not provide some limitation in time upon the rights of citi-
zens to commence actions. The extent to which the law of real property
has applied this just, equitable, and practical doctrine to title problems
is one measure of its effectiveness in any jurisdiction. Within the past
thirty years this principle has been used with modification in an attempt
to solve, what has been called, "The Crisis in Conveyancing." 7
At present in New York there are a number of statutes which limit
to a period in gross the time within which rights affecting real property
72 For other suggested changes to make the public records contain a more complete title
history, see Basye, Clearing Land Titles §§ 31-45 (1953) (hereinafter cited as Basye).
E.g., Prof. Basye suggests that recitals by affidavit as to certain matters not presently
appearing of record and affecting a title be recorded and accepted as evidence of the facts
stated therein.
73 See Spies, "A Critique of Conveyancing," 38 Va. L. Rev. 245 (1952).
74 E.g., see the Administrative Code of the City of New York § 1052-8.0 which establishes
the block and lot index (local name for the tract index) for New York County.
75 See opinion of justice Werner in Brooklyn Bank v. Barnaby, 197 N.Y. 210, 227, 90
N.E. 834, 840 (1910); 3 American Law of Property § 15.1 (Casner ed. 1952). However, the
statute of 21 James I, c. 16 (1623) is acknowledged as the immediate ancestor of the
modern statute of limitations.
76 See Guaranty Trust Company v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 136 (1938); Gregoire
v. Putnam's Sons, 298 N.Y. 119, 81 N.E.2d 45 (1948).
77 The title of a law review article by John C. Payne, 19 Mo. L. Rev. 214 (1954).
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must be asserted.7 8  The most important of these is section 36 of the
Civil Practice Act which requires that an action for the recovery of real
property shall be commenced within fifteen years from the time the
cause of action descends or accrues.79 Certain other interests in property
have been created by statute for a specified duration of time, at the
expiration of which they are extinguished. Another type of limited
interest in property, albeit not real property, is that of a chattel mortgage
which is valid for only three years unless a notice is filed renewing the
lien.8'
These concepts of limitations on rights of action and of terminable
property interests are neither novel to the law of New York. nor to the
generally prevailing law throughout the country. Employment of such
principles more extensively in the law of real property can help reduce
the many doubts and defects that presently encumber titles and prevent
their effortless and efficient transfer. In recent years several mid-
western states82 have enacted legislation embodying these ideas with
this end in mind and with the further hope that the appraisal of a title
could be based on an examination of the land records which is limited
to a relatively recent and constant period of time.83
Iowa adopted the pioneer statute in this field in 1919. It provided
that all claims against a holder in possession of the record title to real
estate arising before January 1, 1900 were barred unless notice thereof
was filed prior to July 4, 1920.4 Under the statute, possession of real
estate is proven of record by the filing of an affidavit, which recites the
78 E.g., N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 31-43 (limitation on actions for the recovery of real
property); id. § 47-a (actions on bonds and mortgages limited to six years); N.Y. Real
Prop. Law § 460 (2-year limitation on dower actions); N.Y. Aband. Prop. Law § 206(1)
(40-year limitation on action against state to release escheated property) ; id. § 215 (15-year
limitation on actions against state for value of property acquired by it as the result of a
judgment of escheat and thereafter sold); N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 17 (1-year limitation
in which to challenge validity of corporate mortgage for lack of consent of stockholders).
79 Except that the state has forty years in which to bring such an action, N.Y. Civ. Prac.
Act § 31 and certain statutory disabilities extend the time in which an action may be
commenced, id. § 43.
80 E.g., id. § 510 (a docketed judgment is a lien on real property for 10 years); N.Y.
Lien Law § 17 (a mechanic's lien is only valid for one year unless continued by court
order); N.Y. Tax Law § 249-11 (claim of state for estate taxes is lien on real property for
fifteen years for property valued at $10,000 or less, and for twenty years on property valued
at more than $10,000).
81 N.Y. Lien Law § 235.
82 Iowa Acts 1919, c. 270; Ind. Stat. Ann. §§ 2-628-37 (Burns 1946); Mich. Stat. Ann.
§§ 26.1271-79 (1953); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 541.023 (1945); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 76-288-98
(1943); N.D. Rev. Code § 47.19A02 (1943); S.D. Code § 51.16B12 (1939); S.A. c. 83,
§ 10a.
83 The desire to make land freely marketable has in the past led to significant changes in
substantive law, e.g., the development of the rule against perpetuities by English courts
from 1682 through 1833, was to prevent restraints on alienation of property. 6 American
Law of Property § 24.4 (Casner ed. 1952).
84 Iowa Code Ann. § 614.17 (1946). This act has been amended periodically to make
the dates more current, and presently it requires all claims arising before January 1, 1940,
to be recorded within one year from and after July 4, 1951. Iowa Acts 1951, c. 209.
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facts of possession, with the local recorder who enters upon the margin
of the record a certificate to such effect.
Although the form of the act is similar to a statute of limitations,
it would be incorrect to regard it solely as such. The significant differ-
ences are that the Iowa law extinguishes all future and non-possessory
claims, notice of which has not been filed within the requisite time,
whether or not they have given rise to a present cause of action; and it
is the filing and not the commencement of an action that is the means
by which property rights are preserved. Both the bar8 5 and the judici-
ary86 have welcomed the statute as a partial solution to the problem of
conveyancing in Iowa.
Wisconsin and Minnesota, in 1941 and 1943 respectively, adopted
statutes which substantially emulated the Iowa act in barring outstand-
ing interests in property unless notice thereof was filed. Enactment of
such a statute by Wisconsin was received with the following sanguine
praise:
The statute will promote economy in land transactions by simplifying
abstracts, reducing the cost of title insurance, and mininizing litigation.
And there should be little damage to vested property interests, since the
apprehension of buyers which induces lengthy searches is disproportionate
to the actual existence of ancient adverse claims. 88
The Wisconsin statute intends to bar all claims to an interest in real
property asserted by one not in possession founded upon an instrument
or event more than thirty years old, unless within such thirty-year period
a notice of the claim has been placed on the record. However, actions
to enforce recorded easements or restrictive covenants are not barred
until a period of sixty years has elapsed since recordation of the instru-
ment containing such encumbrance. Claims of the state, of remainder-
men and reversioners, and of persons under a disability are all within
the statute. An exception is made for real estate-the record title to
85 See Iowa Title Standard No. 10.1 which applies act to title transfers. See Note, 2
Drake L. Rev. 76 (1953).
86 See Lane v. Travelers Ins. Co., 230 Iowa 973, 978, 299 N.W. 553, 555 (1941), which
held that the interests of two contingent remaindermen were barred as a result of failure
to record the required statutory notice, by July 4, 1932, despite the fact that on said date
neither of them had attained their majority. The court stated, in support of its decision:
"Nor are we concerned with the policy of the lawmakers in enacting this measure. We may
observe, however, that there can be little doubt of the desirability of statutes giving greater
effect and stability to record titles. We believe it our duty to enforce this statute as
written." See also Tesdell, Jr. v. Hanes, - Iowa -, 82 N.W.2d 119 (1957), in which the
Iowa Supreme Court held that plaintiff in an action for a declaratory judgment had a
marketable title since there had been compliance with the provisions of the Iowa Marketable
Title Act.
87 Wis. Laws 1941, c. 293, now Wis. Stats. Ann. § 330.15 (1950); Minn. Laws 1943,
c. 529, now Minn. Stats. Ann. § 541.023 (1945).
88 55 Harv. L. Rev. 886, 888 (1942). See also Tulane and Axley "Title to Real Property
-Thirty-Year Limitation Statute," 1942 Wis. L. Rev. 258.
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which is in the state-and for railroad or public service corporations.
Furthermore, a notice recorded after the expiration of the thirty-year
period is effective except as to the rights of a purchaser for value.89 This
provision evidences that the primary purpose of the act is to promote
marketability of titles.
In Minnesota a claim against property in the possession of another is
barred unless within forty years after the execution of the instrument or
the occurrence of the event that gave rise to the claim a verified notice
is filed in the office of the registrar of deeds. Failure to file results is a
conclusive presumption of abandonment of the claim, and the title cannot
be deemed unmarketable as a result thereof. If such notice relates to
vested or contingent rights claimed under a condition subsequent or
other type of restriction, the person filing it has the burden of showing
why such interest has not become nominal. The statute excepts the in-
terests of certain public, religious, and charitable corporations, and, of
course, the rights of the federal government which, in any event, could
not be adversely affected by it. No exception, however, is made for
persons under any form of disability.
In one important respect this act has been criticized as failing to
achieve its objective of limiting the period of title search. 9° By requir-
ing a notice of an interest in real property to be filed within forty years
after the instrument, event, or transaction by which it was created was
executed or occurred, a prospective purchaser can no longer rely on the
record of a title for the past forty years. For example, if the reversioner
of a determinable fee files a notice of his interest immediately after the
instrument has been recorded, a search of the records forty-nine years
later by a prospective purchaser for all claims filed within the past forty
years would not reveal it. It has been suggested that this defect can
be remedied by requiring successive notices to be filed every forty years.
Until recently, it had been assumed9' that the act barred all future
and non-possessory interests, notice of which had not been filed and
applied "to any right, claim, interest, encumbrance or lien,"92 including
future non-possessory interests. However, as a result of the opinion of
the Supreme Court of Minnesota in Wichelman v. Messner,3 this view
no longer obtains; the court there indicated that the statute will, to
some extent, be restrictively interpreted.
89 Originally the act protected bona fide purchasers and in response to criticism the




92 Minn. Stats. Ann. § 541.023, Sub. 2 (1945).
93- Minn. -, 83 N.W.2d 800 (1957).
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The Messner case arose out of the following facts: A parcel of prop-
erty was granted in 1897 to a local school district on the condition that
the premises be used as a schoolhouse "and that whenever such oc-
cupancy and use of the same shall cease and terminate said premises
shall revert to said parties of the first part, their heirs and assigns." In
1946 the school was closed and in 1952 it was sold to the defendant.
Plaintiff, an unsuccessful bidder for the property, solicited the interests
of the heirs of the original grantor, which he acquired for nominal
amounts, and then commenced the instant action to determine adverse
claims to the property and to obtain possession thereof.
The defendants contended that by virtue of the failure of plaintiffs
to file the notice required by the state marketable title act, their interest
had been conclusively presumed abandoned. Plaintiffs replied that the
act only protects a forty-year recorded title from adverse claims which
arise from a separate instrument and has no applicability to adverse
claims predicated upon the same recorded instrument. The court rejected
this argument as contrary to the express language of the statute, the
intent of the legislature, and the purpose of the statute in eliminating
ancient claims which fetter marketability. Furthermore, it held that the
"source of title"94 to which the act refers and which it protects'is fee
simple ownership, absolute or defeasible, and that lesser interests cannot
invoke its protection.9 5
In the course of its opinion, the court, in extensive dicta, comments
on the entire scope and application of the act and reviews related deci-
sions in other states. It gratuitously discusses the effect of the act on
the following property interests:
1. Party-wall agreements and utility easements: These interests, it
is stated, cannot be barred by the act since their owners will always be
94 Minn. Stats. Ann. § 541.023 (1945), sub-division I provides:
As against a claim of title based upon a source of title, which source has then been
of record at least forty years, no action affecting the possession of title of any real
estate shall be commenced by a person, partnership, corporation, state, or any political
division thereof, after January 1, 1948, to enforce any right, claim, interest, incumbrance
or lien founded upon any instrument, event or transaction which was executed or
occurred more than forty years prior to the commencement of such action, unless within
forty years after such execution or occurrence there has been recorded in the office of
the register of deeds or filed in the office of the register of titles in the county in which
the real estate affected is situated, a notice sworn to by the claimant or his agent or
attorney setting forth the name of the claimant, a description of the real estate affected
and of the instrument, event or transaction on which such claim is founded, and
stating whether the right, claim, interest, incumbrance or lien is mature or immature.
If such notice relates to vested or contingent rights claimed under a condition subse-
quent or restriction it shall affirmatively show why such condition or restriction is not,
or has not become nominal so that it may be disregarded under the provisions of
Minnesota Statutes 1945 Section 500.20, subdivision 1.
See 41 Minn. L. Rev. 232 (1957).
95 - Minn. at -, 83 N.W.2d at 816.
1958]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
in possession, and persons in possession are exempt from the require-
ment of filing notice. But what of an easement of which the owner is
not in possession; should he not be required to file?
2. Mineral rights: The court is of the opinion that the reservation or
conveyance of mineral lands, in which the mineral estate is severed from
the surface estate, constitutes the creation of a separate and distinct fee
simple, and that the owner in fee simple, whether of surface or sub-
surface lands, does not have to file the statutory notice. This, however,
assumes that the owner of the mineral estate is in possession, which may
not always be the case. In addition to which, the mineral interest
granted may be less than fee ownership. In both these situations the
interested party should be required to file. Otherwise, a prospective
purchaser would be justified in entertaining the usual presumption that
the owner of the surface land is entitled to all mines beneath."6
3. Mortgages: The court states that recorded mortgages represented
by a "current active relationship with the fee owner" are exempt from the
requirement of filing. It takes the view that payment on the mortgage,
when coupled with its terms, is "conclusive notice" of the mortgagee's
living interest. If the court's view prevails, a prospective purchaser
would be required to investigate the facts behind each mortgage recorded
forty years ago or more to ascertain whether it is active or not. Market-
ability of titles would hardly be advanced by this interpretation of the
statute.
4. Leases: Consistent with its view that "claim of title based upon
a source of title" means fee simple ownership, the court holds that a
lessee cannot invoke the protection of the act. But should not the
interests of a long term lessee be protected by the statute?
5. Remainder Interests: Since a life estate does not constitute fee
simple ownership, no claim of title can be based thereon and a reversioner
or remainderman need not file a notice of such an interest as protection
against the life tenant.
Despite the all-inclusive nature of the language used in the statute to
bar property rights, notice of which has not been filed within 40 years,
the Supreme Court of Minnesota has carved out of its purview the above
interests which represent a considerable segment of the types of claims
which clog titles. Mr. Justice Murphy concludes the opinion, on behalf
of the court, with the following quotation in support of the decision:
"These statutes [marketable title acts] reflect the appraisal of state
legislatures of the actual economic significance of these interests (rights
of reentry and possibilities of reverter), weighed against the inconvenience
96 58 C.J.S. § 132, at 211.
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and expense caused by their continued existence for unlimited periods of
time without regard to altered circumstances." Trustees of School of Town-
ship No. 1. v. Batdorf, 6 Ill. 2d 486, 492, 130 N.E.2d 111, 115; see 43
Ill. L. Rev. 90. They must be construed in the light of the public good
in terms of more secure land transactions which outweighs the burden and
risk imposed upon owners of old outstanding rights to record their inter-
ests. (at 825).
However, the court, in the course of its decision, repudiates the judgment
of the Minnesota legislature, which, in enacting the marketable title act,
has clearly indicated that it is to apply to all property rights. In place
thereof, the court has substituted its conception of which economic
interests are protected by it, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the
act.97
After extensive study of the marketable title statutes of other jurisdic-
tions,9 Michigan in 1945 adopted an act which is significantly different
from the Iowa, Wisconsin and Minnesota statutes discussed above and
which has served as a model for similar enactments by South Dakota,
North Dakota and Nebraska. To avoid any doubt as to its purpose,
the legislature incorporated the following statement into the act:
This act shall be construed to effect the legislative purposes of simplify-
ing and facilitating land title transactions by allowing persons dealing with
the record title owner, as defined herein, to rely on the record title covering
a period of not more than 40 years prior to the date of such dealing and
to that end to extinguish all claims that affect or may affect the interest
thus dealt with... 9
Striking a new approach to the problem,' ° the act first defines market-
able title as a 40-year unbroken chain of record title to property not in
the hostile possession of another. 1' 1 The owner of a marketable title
shall hold such land free and clear of any and all interests which occurred
prior to a 40-year period, unless a verified notice is filed by the claimant
of such an interest within such period.0 2 No disability suspends the
running of the 40-year period, and provision is made for the filing of
such notice by another person on behalf of someone who, for reasons set
forth in the statute, is unable to file the notice. 0 3 A number of interests
are excepted specifically from the operation of the statute, the most
significant of which are the lessor's reversionary interest and the interest
of a mortgagee under an instrument not due. 0 4
97 The Ind., Iowa, Mich., and Wis. statutes all bar interests of remaindermen. See notq
82 supra; 1947 Wis. L. Rev. 681.
98 See Aigler, "Clearance of Land Titles-A Statutory Step," 44 Mich. L. Rev. 45 (1945).
99 Mich. Stat. Ann. § 26.1276 (1953).
100 See discussion p. 654 infra, concerning this definition of marketable title.
101 Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 26.1271-72 (1953).
102 Id. § 26.1273.
103 Ibid.
104 Id. § 26.1274.
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Contrary to the Wisconsin statute, which only protects purchasers, the
Michigan statute applies to any owner of a record title for forty years.
By its express language the statute applies to all interests; lo5 however,
we have already seen 16 that such language may be restrictively inter-
preted by the courts so as to narrow its scope. To date, no judicial
decision has applied the statute. But a title standard adopted by the
Michigan State Bar Association10 7 so interprets the act that any interest
which appears in the record chain of title is not barred by the failure to
file a notice thereof .10 This reduces the scope of claims affected by the
statute and, in effect, perpetuates such interests as possibilities of re-
verter and rights of re-entry. It remains to be seen whether the Mich-
igan courts will adopt this interpretation and whittle away at the
inclusive language used in the statute.1 9
A third form of statute which endeavors to promote marketability
through a temporal limitation of interests in property has been adopted
in Indiana"' and Illinois."' The Illinois act automatically extinguishes
possibilities of reverter and rights of re-entry after fifty years and makes
no provision which permits continuance of such interests by filing of a
notice." 2 The Indiana statute bars the claims of all interests in real
property upon which neither a suit has been commenced nor a notice
filed within fifty years. Filing of the required notice merely extends the
time for the commencement of an action to enforce such claim for one
year. By requiring litigation where no cause of action may exist, and by
not permitting the preservation of an interest in real estate beyond the
stated period, the Indiana act may be constitutionally defective."'
105 Prof. Aigler, who assisted in the drafting of the statute, has expressed the view that
the act extends "to any interest in land" and is not meant to be confined solely to fee
ownership. See Aigler, supra note 98, at 48.
106 See discussion in text, Wichelman v. Messner, p. 630 supra.
107 Title Standard 1.7, 35 Mich. St. B.J. 27 (1956).
108 Cf. Wichelman v. Messner, supra note 93, which comes to a contrary result based on
a similar statute.
109 It is rather difficult to appreciate how this could be rationalized in view of the
statutory admonition that "The claims hereby extinguished shall mean any and all interests
of any nature whatever, however denominated, and whether such claims are asserted by a
person sui juris or under disability, whether such person is within or without the state,
and whether such person is natural or corporate, or private or governmental." Mich. Stat.
Ann. § 26.1276 (1953).
110 Ind. Stat. Ann. §§ 2.628-637 (Burns 1946).
111 Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 30, §§ 37b-371 (Smith-Hurd 1942). See also id. c. 83, § 10-a for
the Ilinois version of the more standard limitation type of marketable title act providing
that claims to real property more than 75 years old shall not constitute notice nor be
admitted into evidence. Any claim can be preserved for 10 years by filing within 3 years
of the 75-year period a notice thereof. The permitted length of time and the many ex-
ceptions set forth in the statute severely limit its effectiveness.
112 The act has been declared constitutional in Trustees of Schools of Township No. 1.
Batdorf, 6 Ill. 2d 486, 130 N.E.2d 111 (1950).




Certainly, no valid purpose is served by requiring that a suit be com-
menced in addition to filing of a notice.114
Although the United States Supreme Court has not spoken as to the
constitutionality of any of the marketable title acts discussed above, the
Minnesota act has been declared constitutional by the Supreme Court
of that state,115 the Supreme Court of Iowa has assumed the validity of
its statute,116 and the Michigan statute was considered, in a scholarly
review of the problem, not to have violated any constitutional
prohibitions."17
Enactment of marketable title statutes, as these acts are known, can
only be constitutionally justified as an exercise of the police power of
the state. That such power extends to the control of titles to land cannot
seriously be questioned. The United States Supreme Court, speaking by
Mr. Chief Justice White, has said:""
As it is indisputable that the general welfare of society is involved in
the security of titles to real estate and in the public registry of such titles,
it is obvious that the power to legislate as to such subjects is in the very
nature of government. (at 59).
Marketable title statutes have won the enthusiasm and praise of most
commentators as a means of simplifying title transactions and promoting
the greater alienability of land."9 Consequently, such legislation is
reasonably related to its worthwhile aims and must be considered a
legitimate exercise of the police power.' 0
The two primary reasons advanced against the validity of such statutes
are that they deprive one of property without due process of law and
impair the obligation of contract. On general principles, neither argu-
ment has merit. However, any specific statute may be drafted so
poorly as to impinge on a constitutional guarantee. Under the Iowa,
Minnesota or Michigan statutes, or their counterparts in other states, no
one need forfeit any property interest, provided he is sufficiently alert to
the requirement of these statutes that he file a notice of such interest.
Failure to file, may have consequences similar to a failure to record an
114 Basye 269. Also see 27 Ind. LJ. 101 (1951) in which the author suggests four
different constructions of the statute in an effort to determine the purpose of requiring the
commencement of an action and rejects all four interpretations as senseless.
115 Wichelman v. Messner, - Minn. -, 83 N.W.2d 800 (1957).
116 Lane v. Travelers Ins. Co., 230 Iowa 973, 299 N.W. 553 (1941); see also Lytle v.
Gulliams, 241 Iowa 523, 41 N.W.2d 668 (1950); Swanson v. Pontralo, 238 Iowa 693, 27
N.W.2d 21 (1947).
117 Aigler, "Constitutionality of Marketable Title Acts," 50 Mich. L. Rev. 185 (1951).
118 American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47 (1911).
119 Aigler, supra note 98; Leahy, "The North Dakota Marketable Record Title Act," 29
N. Dak. L. Rev. 265 (1953); 55 Harv. L. Rev. 886 (1942); 1947 Wis. L. Rev. 681.
120 See Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 640 (1950).
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instrument under the recording acts in effect in all states-in both
instances property rights can be lost. Yet, the constitutionality of the
recording acts is not questioned. Furthermore, by requiring the filing of
such notice no contractual right is impaired. The state has traditionally
had the power to prescribe the time and manner in which rights may
be enforced, provided a reasonable time is allowed to assert such rights
before they are extinguished.1
21
Three fairly recent decisions issued by the highest courts of Kansas,
122
Pennsylvania, 2 ' and Florida, 24 holding as unconstitutional statutes which
limit an interest in real property, should not be interpreted as a judicial
indictment of all marketable title acts. In all three cases th6 offending
statute contained the same evil of requiring commencement of an action
in order to preserve the property interest otherwise terminated by law,
despite the fact that no cause of action may yet have accrued. The
Pennsylvania court found the statute of that state2 5 objectionable be-
cause it required "... . parties to institute an action where no controversy
exists .. .p126 The Kansas court characterized the statute before it 2 7
as the conversion of an estate in possession to a mere right of action.
Florida's Supreme Court held unconstitutional a state statute:," abolish-
ing possibilities of reverter after twenty-one years as impairing the
obligation of contracts.
The constitutionality of marketable title statutes will not be sustained
if the courts adopt a vested rights theory of property which views such
rights as absolutes untempered by social needs. A more fruitful analysis
of the validity of such statutes would assess the relative importance of
the following elements: (1) gravity of the evil to be corrected; (2) ef-
fectiveness of the corrective measures adopted; (3) extent of the loss
resulting from adopted measures; and (4) availability of alternate
121 Turner v. New York, 168 U.S. 90 (1897).
122 Murrison v. Fenstermacher, 166 Kan. 568, 203 P.2d 160 (1949).
123 Girard Trust Company v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 364 Pa. 576, 73 A.2d 371 (1950).
124 Biltmore Village, Inc. v. Royal, 71 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1954) ; but cf., Trustees of Schools
of Township No. 1 v. Batdorf, 6 Ill. 2d 486, 130 N.E.2d 111 (1950), which held a similar
statute to be constitutional.
125 Pa. P.L. 1692 (1949), Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 68, §§ 451-57 (Supp. 1956). Section 451,
which sought to quiet title to realty and facilitate alienation thereof by creating a pre-
sumption of payment, satisfaction or release of any claim for money charged against
realty for a period of 50 years, except if an action or proceeding has been instituted for the
collection thereof.
126 Girard Trust Co. v. Penn. R. Co., 71 Pa. D. & C. 533, 545, aff'd, 364 Pa. 576, 73
A.2d 371 (1950).
127 Kans. Gen. Stat. §§ 67-612 (Supp. 1947), which provides that certain deeds recorded
for more than 25 years prior to the effective date of the act shall be conclusively presumed
to have conveyed perfect title, unless an action is brought within one year from such date.
128 Fla. Laws c. 26927 (1951), which cancels all possibilities of reverter in deeds in
effect for more than 21 years, except that the holder of such a reverter is given one year in
which to assert his rights by commencement of suit.
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methods of correction. 2 9 Constitutionality would thereby be determined
by operative factors rather than a priori reasoning.
There is no law or reason peculiar to New York which should prevent
the legislature from adopting a marketable title act once it is agreed
upon its wisdom. Enactment of statutes of limitation has long been
recognized in this state as not violative of any constitutional guarantee.
As expressed by the Court of Appeals:
... such a statute (of limitations) will bar any right, however high the
source from which it may be deduced, provided that a reasonable time is
given a party to enforce his right.130
The legislature and courts of New York have garnered considerable
experience with statutes of limitation affecting tax sale deeds which
suggest similar constitutional problems to those raised by marketable
title acts. Section 132"'s of the Tax Law provides that every conveyance
executed by the Comptroller and others, pursuant to a tax sale and
recorded for two years, shall be conclusive evidence of the regularity of
such sale; the conveyance may be subject to cancellation for certain
specified causes, pursuant to an action brought within five years from
the date fixed for redemption. Although the first portion of the statute
is couched in terms of a curative act," the latter part has been inter-
preted and applied as a statute of limitation,"'3 and its constitutional
validity has not been denied.
Whether marketable title statutes will fully justify the tremendous op-
timism for the reform some of their proponents have predicted 134 is ques-
129 See Note, 55 Colum. L. Rev. 235 (1955); Wichelman v. Messner, supra note 115, at
811.
130 Meigs v. Roberts, 162 N.Y. 371, 378, 56 N.E. 838, 840 (1900).
131 This section is originally derived from the Laws of 1885, c. 448, as amended by Laws
of 1891, c. 217.
132 The distinction between a curative act and a statute of limitations is made by Chief
judge Cullen in Meigs v. Roberts, 162 N.Y. 371, 56 N.E. 838 (1900): one is enacted to
cure past irregularities which are not jurisdictional and the other to extinguish substantial
rights by barring an action thereon.
133 Dunkum v. Maceck Building Corp., 256 N.Y. 275, 176 N.E. 392 (1931); Halstead v.
Selberstein, 196 N.Y. 1, 89 N.E. 443 (1909); Meigs v. Roberts, supra note 132; Matter of
Kantor, 280 App. Div. 605, 117 N.Y.S.2d 110 (2d Dep't 1952) ; Doud v. Huntington Hebrew
Congregation, 178 App. Div. 748, 165 N.Y. Supp. 908 (2d Dep't 1917). But cf. Cameron
Estates v. Deering, 308 N.Y. 24, 123 N.E.2d 621 (1954); People v. Faxon, 111 Misc. 699,
182 N.Y. Supp. 242 (Sup. Ct. Saratoga County 1920). In the Deering case the six-year
conclusive presumption of validity of recorded tax deeds contained in the Suffolk County
Tax Act was at issue. The court, in holding this section of the statute as inapplicable to
void deeds, characterizes it as a curative act rather than a statute of limitation. Unfortu-
nately, the opinion is not dear as to the court's reasons for its decision in this regard. The
dissent by Judge Desmond views the act as a statute of limitations and, therefore, holds
that the action is barred regardless of whether or not the deed was originally void or void-
able. However, he too fails to state why, in his opinion, the act limits actions rather than
cures defects. In the event that the majority intended its opinion to apply to a statute of
limitations, then it would be inconsistent with the cases cited in this note and might
obviate the value of any marketable title act in the state.
134 E.g., Basye 274; see note 118 supra.
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tionable. The property interests excepted from the purview of these
statutes, although few in number, prevent the title examiner from search-
ing the records for only the limited period of time set forth in the
statute.13 5 The length of time during which a title will be examined, in
the final analysis, will be determined by the longest period during which
any valid claim can exist. Furthermore, some critics of the existing
system, although regarding such statutes as "... . a step in the right direc-
tion . .." fundamentally consider them as unsatisfactory compromises.
More extensive and far-reaching reform is advocated in which all non-
possessory interests are individually considered, and either abolished or
severely limited in order to prevent their clogging land records. 130
A marketable title statute may not be the panacea for our conveyanc-
ing ills; however, by eliminating stale claims it can do much to reduce the
number of outstanding defects in a record title. The advantages resulting
to the public therefrom in accelerating the alienability of land and reduc-
ing the number of actions to quiet title outweigh by far the desirability
of permitting claimants to sit unrestrictedly on their rights. Indeed, in
our modern world which requires decisiveness in human conduct, there
is no reason to indulge those who act otherwise. Passage of such a




No form of human endeavor is free from the possibility of error. And
conveyancing with its attendant formalities and niceties provides excel-
lent opportunity for many irregularities, omissions, and defects to occur.
Although in recent times, most instruments transferring real property
have been prepared by attorneys rather than grantors, notaries, or public
officials, thus raising the general quality -of such instruments, the volume
of land transactions is so enormous that errors inevitably result.
135 See Aigler, supra note 98, at 54. Ralph Jossman of the Committee on Titles of
the Michigan Bar Association, in a letter dated December 10, 1957, addressed to the writer,
states that the Michigan State Bar Association has declined to adopt a title standard
approving the use of a forty-year abstract for this reason.
16 Payne, "The Crisis in Conveyancing," 19 Mo. L. Rev. 214 (1954). In Prof. Payne's
view, the Michigan statute is "an oversimplified attack on an inherently complicated
problem," id. at 224, and he suggests that the variety of property interests must each be
treated in a different manner, e.g., liens, limited to a short period of years, mortgages limited
to a twenty-year period with provision for re-recording thereafter, future interests should
all be placed in trust or abolished, and co-ownership of property should be eliminated.
Though Prof. Payne's ideas are so radical that the "cure" may seem worse than the "disease,"
it is well to remember that other societies have prevented the development of such property
interests because of their adverse affect on land alienability. In France, for instance, future
interests are not recognized for this reason. See Max Rheinstein, "Some Fundamental
Differences in Real Property Ideas of the 'Civil Law' and the Common Law Systems,"
3 U. Chi. L. Rev. 624 (1936).
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The possible consequences of a defective conveyance are manifold; it
may be: (1) invalid between the parties; (2) incompetent to be recorded;
(3) inadequate to constitute constructive notice; (4) inadmissible in evi-
dence; and (5) ineffective to provide marketable title. 3 7
A carelessly drawn deed, therefore, can provoke litigation, result in
the loss of money, or impede the alienability of land. The grantee who
accepts such a deed traditionally has two remedies available to him. He
can request a corrected deed from the grantor or he can petition a court
of equity for relief. The first alternative has its obvious limitations in
that the grantor may be deceased or unwilling to issue a corrective deed.
The second alternative is costly, time consuming, and without assurance
of success. The need for an effective and inexpensive method of curing
otherwise valid titles of minor defects and irregularities has, consequent-
ly, prompted the rise of a special form of legislation known as curative
or validating statutes. These statutes so contribute to the efficient opera-
tion of a conveyancing system that any system which lacks such legisla-
tion must be considered incomplete.
A curative statute is defined as:
• . . one whose purpose is to cure past errors, omissions, and neglects
[.. (and] is . .. intended to give legal effect to a past act ineffective
because of non-compliance with legal requirements. 138
The great virtue of curative legislation is that it imparts legality and
efficacy to a legal act according to the intent of the parties without the
necessity of judicial intervention. Its social value is so appealing that
some form of curative legislation can be found in every state'39 and the
courts have encouraged their enactment. 40
Frequently, these statutes have been attacked as legislation which is
ex post facto, impairs the obligation of contracts, or deprives one of
vested property rights. The United States Supreme Court, early in its
judicial life, rejected the triad of this argument in Watson v. Mercer.'4 '
Plaintiff therein had instituted an action of ejectment to recover land
acquired by descent from James Mercer and his wife, Margaret. The
defendants were the remote grantees of said James and Margaret Mercer
through one named Thompson who was their immediate grantor. The
deed from James and Margaret Mercer to Thompson, dated May 8,
1785, was not acknowledged by Margaret according to the law of Penn-
sylvania then in effect for the conveyancing of real estate by femes covert.
137 Basye 294.
138 16A C.J.S. § 421 at 124.
139 3 American Law of Property § 12.84 (Casner ed. 1952).
140 E.g., see Bennett v. Fisher, 26 Iowa 497, 501 (1868).
141 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 88 (1834).
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However, in 1826, Pennsylvania enacted a statute, the object of which
was to cure all defective acknowledgments of this sort and impart to
them the same effect as if they had originally been taken in the proper
form. Mr. Justice Story delivered the unanimous opinion of the court
which sustained title in the defendants and held that:
... [I] t is clear, that this court has no right to pronounce an act of the
state legislature void, as contrary to the constitution of the United States,
from the mere fact that it divests antecedent vested rights of property. The
constitution of the United States does not prohibit the states from passing
retrospective law generally; but only ex post facto laws. Now, it has been
solemnly settled by this court that the phrase, ex post facto laws, is not
applicable to civil laws, but to penal and criminal laws ....
In the next place, does the Act of 1826 violate the obligation of any
contract? In our judgment it certainly does not, either in its terms or its
principles .... So far, then, as it has any legal operation it goes to confirm,
and not to impair, the contract of the remes covert. It gives the very
effect to their acts and contracts which they intended to give; and which,
from mistake or accident, has not been effected .... 142
The Court did not and, at that time, could not have concerned itself
with the question of whether the statute violated the constitution of the
State of Pennsylvania. However, after the enactment of the fourteenth
amendment in 1868, the proponents of the vested rights theory no longer
had to rely solely on natural law in opposing curative legislation,1 43 and
sought support from the due process clause contained in that amendment.
But most courts rejected this argument, substantially adopting the at-
titude of the New Jersey court, which stated:
But laws curing defects, which would otherwise operate to frustrate
what must be presumed to be the desire of the party affected, cannot be
considered as taking away vested rights. Courts do not regard rights as
vested contrary to the justice and equity of the case.' 44
Therefore, curative statutes have, in general, been held constitu-
tional' 45 provided there has been no interference with the rights of
innocent third parties that have accrued in the interim between the oc-
currence of the defect and the date of the enactment of the statute. As
between the parties to the instrument, such a statute will always validate
the defect ab initio; but as to third parties, there is a constitutional re-
quirement that the statute must operate only from the passage of the
act. 14
142 Id. at 110-11.
143 Russell v. Rumsey, 35 Ill" 362 (1864).
144 Elmer, J., in State v. City of Newark, 27 N.J.L. 185, 197 (1858).
145 See 57 A.L.R. 1197 (1928) (Constitutionality of Curative Acts).
146 E.g., Hill v. Yarborough, 62 Ark. 320, 35 S.W. 433 (1896) ; Snortum v. Snortum, 155
Minn. 230, 193 N.W. 304 (1923).
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The general limitation upon legislative power to enact curative or
validating legislation has been accurately expressed as follows:
If the thing wanting or which failed to be done, and which constitutes
the defect in the proceeding is something the necessity for which the legisla-
ture might have dispensed with by prior statute, then it is not beyond the
power of the legislature to dispense with it by subsequent statute. And if
the irregularity consists in doing some act, or in the mode or manner of
doing some act, which the legislature might have made immaterial by prior
law, it is equally competent to make the same immaterial by a subsequentlaw. 147
Furthermore, the legislature cannot by a curative act make a void deed
valid or transfer property from one person to another where the defect
is so material that no title was initially conveyed.
48
Irregularities that may be cured by statute are numerous, and the
legislation which has been enacted by the states is diverse. 49 The
primary types of defects cured include those in instruments which are im-
properly executed, lack a seal, or are improperly attested or inadequately
acknowledged. Statutes of some states such as California are very broad
and cure "any defect, omission or informality" in an instrument affecting
title to property and relating to its execution, certificate of acknowledg-
ment or absence of such a certificate. 50 In comparison, other states
have adopted statutes which cure a very limited class of defects. For
instance, the statute in force in Arkansas only validates deeds contain-
ing acknowledgments which are defective as a result of eight specific
situations.' 51 In Missouri the statute 52 operates retrospectively so that
the only defectively acknowledged deeds validated are those which had
been recorded one year previous to 1939, the date the law was adopted.'53
Such a statute has to be re-enacted periodically to advance the date of
instruments within its purview. In other states these statutes operate
prospectively and only instruments recorded after the enactment of the
statute are affected. 54
147 2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 775-76 (8th ed. 1927).
148 See Wallace v. McEchron, 176 N.Y. 424, 429, 68 N.E. 663, 665 (1903)q Ostrander v.
Bell, 199 App. Div. 304, 192 N.Y. Supp. 262 (3d Dep't 1921).
149 For a complete discussion of various defects cured by different state enactments see
Basye §§ 231-364 at 336-537.
150 Cal. Civ. Code § 1207 (Deering 1949). However, this broad statutory language has
been restricted by judicial interpretation. See McCroskey v. Ladd, 28 Pac. 216 (Cal. 1891),
in which a deed from a corporation failed to recite the authority of the directors to convey
the property and lacked a seal. These defects the court held were not cured by this statute
and, consequently, plaintiff's title was rendered unmarketable.
151 Ark. Stats. Ann. § 49.213 (1947).
152 Mo. Ann. Stat. § 490.340 (1949).
153 Hatcher v. Hall, 292 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. 1956), held, in conformity with previous
Missouri decisions, that this statute is one of repose and only applies to deeds recorded one
year prior to its last enactment. To date the statute has been reenacted six times: 1939
§ 1845; 1929 § 1681; 1919 § 5368; 1909 § 6313; 1899 § 3118; 1889 § 4864.
154 E.g., see Jackson v. Hudspeth, 208 Ark. 55, 57, 184 S.W.2d 906, 908 (1945).
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Another basis of difference between various curative statutes is the
requisite length of time an instrument must be recorded before the statute
is operative. In Michigan the statute validates the defective instrument
immediately upon recordation.15 5 But in Ohio a deed defective by virtue
of certain statutory reasons is not cured until recorded for more than
twenty-one years.
15
The extent of the cure provided by such statutes is a further point of
variance. The act of Illinois imparts to a recorded deed containing a
defective attestation or acknowledgment clause constructive notice only
to subsequent purchasers and creditors, as if no defect existed; but such
deed cannot be read into evidence unless the defects of the acknowledg-
ment are proven according to the rules of evidence. 57 Colorado's statute
provides that defectively acknowledged instruments recorded for twenty
years are acceptable as prima facie evidence of their contents.15  The
operative language of the curative statutes of most states, however,
validates the instrument bearing the defect without mention of the ques-
tion of evidence. 1 59
The foregoing brief survey of curative acts indicates what can be
accomplished by such legislation and helps establish the following basic
desiderata by which the value of a particular curative statute should be
measured:
1. Validation of all formal defects and omissions.
2. Qualification of the instrument for recordation, making it effective
to give notice to third parties and admissible in evidence.
3. Protection of the rights of third parties who have acquired an
interest for value prior to the date the defect is cured.
4. Effectuation of such cure immediately or within a reasonably short
time.
Let us examine the relevant New York curative statutes in light of
these standards, to determine their sufficiency. The statutes in question
are the following two sections of the New York Real Property Law: 10
§ 306 Certificat of acknowledgment or proof:
A person taking the acknowledgment or proof of a conveyance must
indorse thereupon or attach thereto, a certificate, signed by himself, stating
all the matters required to be done, known or proved on the taking of
155 Mich. Stat. Ann. § 26.824 (1953). This statute, however, only affects conveyances
made in good faith and upon a valuable consideration.
156 Ohio Rev. Code § 5301.07 (Page 1953).
157 Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 30, § 30 (Smith-Hurd 1934).
158 Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 118-6.2, 118-6.6, 118-6.7 (1953).
159 E.g., Md. Ann. Code art. 21, §§ 96-100 (1957); Ind. Stat. Ann. § 15.130e (Burns
1950).




such acknowledgment or proof; together with the name and substance of
the testimony of each witness examined before him, and if a subscribing
witness, his place of residence.
Any conveyance which has heretofore been recorded, or which may here-
after be recorded, shall be deemed to have been duly acknowledged or
proved and properly authenticated, when fifteen years have elapsed since
such recording; saving, however, the rights of every purchaser in good faith
and for a valuable consideration deriving title from the same vendor or
grantor, his heirs or devisees, to the same property or any portion thereof,
whose conveyance shall have been duly recorded before the said period of
fifteen years shall have elapsed. (As amended L. 1954, c. 210, § 1, eff.
Sept. 1, 1954.)
§ 332 The record of certain conveyances validated:
1. The record made prior to July first, nineteen hundred fifty-five in the
office of the recording officer of any county in this state of any deed,
mortgage, assignment or satisfaction piece of a mortgage, or other con-
veyance or power of attorney, otherwise authorized to be recorded therein,
notwithstanding that the certificate of acknowledgment or proof did not
set forth the place of residence of a subscribing witness or of a corporate
officer or director, or did not set it forth with sufficient particularity, and
notwithstanding any other defect in the form of the certificate of acknowl-
edgment or proof or the failure to append thereto a certificate as to the
authority of the person who took the acknowledgment or proof, to take
the same, or any defect in the form of such certificate of authority, shall
be in all respects as valid and effectual as though such certificate of ac-
knowledgment or proof or certificate of authority had been in proper form
or such certificate of authority had been appended to such instrument. Pro-
vided only that such person was duly authorized at the time of taking the
proof or acknowledgment to take the same in the county where the instru-
ment is recorded or in the place, whether within or without the United
States, where the same was taken.
2. All acknowledgments or proofs of conveyance of real property made
or taken prior to April tenth, nineteen hundred thirty, before a judge, clerk,
deputy clerk or special deputy clerk if a court not of record of this state are
confirmed.
3. All acts of the secretary of state of any state or territory of the
United States in authenticating a certificate of acknowledgment or proof
of a conveyance of real property within the state, performed before October
first, nineteen hundred twenty-five, are hereby confirmed, provided that
the said certificate of authentication is in the form required by the laws
of this state on March twenty-third, nineteen hundred twenty-six or now
required by law.
4. If an instrument is recorded hereafter notwithstanding the omission
from the certificate of acknowledgment or proof of the street and street
number of a subscribing witness or of a corporate officer or director con-
trary to the provisions of section three hundred four and three hundred
nine of this chapter, the record of such instrument shall not be invalidated
by reason of such omission nor shall the title founded on such instrument
be impaired thereby.
5. Nothing in this section shall effect any pending action or proceeding
nor the rights of any purchaser in good faith and for a valuable considera-
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tion whose conveyance shall have been duly recorded before this section
as amended shall take effect. (As amended L. 1955, c. 593, § 3, eff.
July 1, 1955.)
It is apparent, therefore, that the only formal defects cured by the New
York statutes relate to acknowledgments and certificates of acknowledg-
ment and authentication. Is the first criterion of the posited standards,
that a curative act validate all formal defects, then satisfied? Perhaps
on first impression it would appear so, since under New York law the
only formal requirement for recording a conveyance is that it be duly
acknowledged or proved and be accompanied by a certificate thereof. 01'
No form of certificate for an individual acknowledgment is demanded;
the sole statutory requisite of such acknowledgment is that it must have
been made before an officer who knows, or has satisfactory evidence,
that the person making the acknowledgment is the person who executed
the instrument and is described in it.162 However, the statute does pre-
scribe a required form of certificate for a corporate acknowledgment.
1 63
Investigation of title records discloses many other defects which have
been cured under legislation in sister states, but in many instances the
substantive law of New York is such that there is no need for similar
curative legislation here. For instance, statutes that validate instruments
which lack a seal,' or are unattested,16 5 or employ unconventional words
of conveyance,' 6 need not concern us since an instrument in New York
must neither be sealed 6 7 nor attested 1 8 to be effective; nor are any
special words of art necessary to convey property.'6 9 The abolition of
dower and curtesy in New York for property acquired by married per-
sons after 1930170 has substantially eliminated the need for curative
legislation on that question.
In certain specific circumstances in New York, in order for a convey-
ance to be acceptable for recordation, it is necessary that the place of
residence of the purchaser be recited therein. 17 ' But the statute requiring
this provides that if a recorded conveyance does not comply, such con-
veyance is not affected by the noncompliance, nor is the title founded on
161 N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 291.
162 Id. § 303.
163 Id. § 309.
164 E.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76.213 (1943).
165 E.g., Wyo. Com. Stat. § 66.302 (1945).
166 E.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 25, § 131 (1953).
167 Heburn v. Reynolds, 73 Misc. 73, 132 N.Y. Supp. 460 (County Ct. Oneida County
1911); N.Y. Real Prop. Law §§ 242-43.
168 The Commissioners of the U.S. Deposit Fund v. Chase, 6 Barb. 37 (N.Y. 1849).
169 Turner v. May, 202 Misc. 320, 117 N..Y.S.2d 778 (Sup. Ct. Columbia County 1952);
N.Y. Real Prop. Law §§ 240(3), 258.
170 N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 190; see Matter of Smith, 202 Misc. 64, 107 N.Y.S.2d 993
(Surr. Ct. Broome County 1951).
171 N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 333.
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such a conveyance impaired. 72 The impact of this section, then, is to
impose a ministerial duty upon the registrar of titles, which duty is such
that there is no adverse effect on the titles recorded if it is not performed.
However, there are defects appearing in recorded instruments in New
York which are not eliminated by the existing New York curative
statutes. Sections 306 and 332 of the Real Property Law apply solely to
"conveyances." Consequently, these sections do not validate acknowledg-
ments contained in executory contracts and powers of attorney since the
statutory definition of "conveyances" excludes such instruments. 173 Since
these instruments are required to be acknowledged or proved in a manner
similar to a deed, a defective acknowledgment, though not affecting the
validity of the instrument between the immediate parties, would render
it invalid as to third persons without notice.Y4 This might operate to
the serious disadvantag of a contract vendee. However, a deed executed
pursuant to a defectively acknowledged, but recorded, power of attorney
would not necessarily be invalid, since the recorded power, albeit defec-
tive, would still be some proof of the authority of the persons executing
the instrument.
Another problem in conveyancing which often arises with respect to
powers of attorney and which adversely affects marketability is the de-
fective exercise of the power by its donee who acts personally, failing to
indicate that he is acting for the donor of the power.175 Virginia, for
example, has adopted a curative act which makes such a conveyance valid
as an act performed on behalf of the donor. 7
Since conveyances by corporations are subject to many rules of law,.77
there is great opportunity for numerous defects to appear of record. A
corporate deed may be irregular for a variety of reasons, including: fail-
ure to affix the corporate seal, lack of authority in the person executing
the instrument, defect in corporate existence, and conveyancing consti-
tuting an ultra vires act' The legislatures of various states have been
concerned with many of these problems and numerous curative statutes
have been enacted.' In New York, however, the problem has been
172 Ibid.
'73 Id. § 290(3).
174 See Spraker v. Spraker, 152 Misc. 867, 870, 274 N.Y. Supp. 454, 457 (Sup. Ct.
Herkimer County 1933).
175 Patton, Land Titles §§ 408-10 (1957).
176 Va. Code Ann. § 55-23 (1950); see also Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1337.03 (Page 1954);
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 303 (1955).
177 E.g., see NY. Stock Corp. Law § 20; N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law §§ 50-53.
178 See Basye 427-63, at §§ 291-301 for an extended discussion of this problem.
179 E.g., conveyance by a dissolved corporation: Ark. Stat. § 50-426 (1947); Cal. Corp.
Code § 5403 (1953); corporate conveyances prior to incorporation validated: Colo. Rev.
Stat. Ann. c. 118-8-6 (1953); authority to execute conveyance conferred retroactively: Fla.




Many other defects, which affect recorded instruments in this state,
could be cured by legislation, such as conveyances by infants, incom-
petents, partnerships and fiduciaries, defects in description and in judi-
cial proceedings, and errors in recordation. 8'
The foregoing discussion is intended to demonstrate that a curative act
which focuses solely on irregularities with respect to acknowledgments is
at best incomplete. Aware that title security and marketability can be
greatly advanced by use of curative legislation to its fullest potential,
many states have abandoned legislation which validates specific defects
and have enacted general statutes which apply to all irregularities con-
stitutionally capable of being corrected by law.182
We now turn to the second criterion of desirable curative legislation:
all defects cured should be effective to give record notice to third parties
and be admissible in evidence. Though the recording law of New York
declares that every conveyance not recorded is void as against all sub-
sequent purchasers, 18 3 it makes no specific mention of notice to such per-
sons. "But the courts, by construction, make the record of a conveyance,
notice to subsequent purchasers; but this doctrine is subject to the limita-
tion, that it is notice only, to those claiming under the same grantor, or
through one who is the common source of title."' 84 Once an instrument
is properly recorded it, therefore, constitutes constructive notice. A de-
fective instrument, although recorded, would not impart such notice un-
less the defect were cured by statute. 88 To the extent that New York
acts validate irregular acknowledgments, such acknowledgments and the
instruments to which they attach provide constructive notice to third
parties.
Under the New York Civil Practice Act,186 a conveyance duly recorded
or entitled to be recorded is admissible in evidence. A recorded instru-
ment bearing an acknowledgment validated by statute would, therefore,
be considered as duly recorded and admitted into evidence. Such in-
(1946) ; N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 55-158 (1950); deeds of corporations defectively formed
validated: Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. c. 168, § 41 (1954); Md. Ann. Code art. 23, § 124 (1957);
corporate deed executed as individual deed validated: Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §§ 685, 687(1938).
180 But see N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law. § 14(2)-seal on instrument creates a presumption
that instrument authoritatively executed.
181 See Basye 336-537, §§ 231-364.
182 E.g., Iowa Code Ann. §§ 589.2-4 (1946); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §§ 39-133 (1947);
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 235.20 (1955).
183 N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 291.
184 Andrews, J. in Tarbell v. West, 86 N.Y. 280, 288 (1881).
185 Basye 359.
186 Section 384(1) (2); § 386 applies the same rule to other instruments which are not




struments, however, do not have the benefit of weighted evidence.8 7
For example, in Delaware the statute curing defective acknowledgments
provides that such evidence shall be conclusive of the truth of the con-
tents; 18 the Alabama statute expressly provides that recorded instru-
ments are prima facie evidence.' 89 But despite the bald language of the
statute, there is some authority in New York which holds that a recorded
acknowledgment has presumptive validity.19°
Neither section 306 nor 332 of the Real Property Law can be assailed
as constitutionally invalid for violating the rights of innocent third
parties. Both sections of the New York curative legislation are explicitly
inapplicable to purchasers in good faith and for a valuable considera-
tion,191 thereby satisfying our third criterion.
The fourth standard by which the New York curative acts should be
judged is whether the statutory cures become operative immediately or
within a reasonable time after recordation.
All conveyances recorded prior to July 1, 1955, containing any defects
in the certificate of acknowledgment or proof thereof, are validated as
of the effective date of the statute. 92 Immediate prospective validity is
only accorded conveyances with certificates of acknowledgment that
fail to recite the street or street number of the address of a subscribing
witness or of a corporate officer or director. Thus a few specific defects
in connection with the certificate of acknowledgment or proof are im-
mediately validated. Errors occurring in acknowledgments or certificates
thereof recorded after July 1, 1955, however, are not cured until fifteen
years have elapsed from the recordation of such conveyance. 93 Al-
though the legislature has recently reduced such period from twenty to
fifteen years, 9 4 one questions the need for maintaining even the present
187 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 384(3) expressly provides that a recorded conveyance is not
conclusive and may be rebutted by other evidence.
188 Del. Code Ann. tit. 25, § 132 (1953).
189 Ala. Code Ann. tit. 47, § 28 (1940).
190 Spraker v. Spraker, 152 Misc. 867, 274 N.Y. Supp. 454 (Sup. Ct. Herkimer County
1933).
191 See text of statutes pp. 642, 643 supra, § 332 applies to all third persons, but § 306
only applies to persons who acquire rights from the same grantor. Quaere whether this
difference is significant in view of the fact that a recorded instrument is constructive notice
only to persons claiming in the same line of title? See Lizzo v. Craft, 135 N.Y.S.2d 748
(Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1954), appeal dismissed, 284 App. Div. 862, 135 N.Y.S.2d 777
(4th Dep't 1954).
192 N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 332(1).
193 Id. § 306.
194 N.Y. Laws 1954, c. 210 amended the waiting period from twenty to fifteen years.
The report accompanying the bill stated, inter alia:
In handling real estate transactions the closing of titles are frequently delayed because
objections are raised relative to the phraseology of an acknowledgment, proof or
certificate of authentication. These delays can block the efficient handling of the real
estate transactions and cause substantial embarrassment and cost to the parties involved.
Frequently the long lapse of time since an instrument was acknowledged defectively
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fifteen year period. The argument has been advanced by some authors
that to make curative acts immediately applicable to future transactions
would
.. seriously tend to relax the protective requirements imposed by society
upon the performance of such acts. Moreover, it would detract from the
effort to provide high standards of craftsmanship in the preparation of
deeds and conveyances. It would constitute, in effect, advance authority
to commit errors, to relax vigilance in the everyday tasks of conveyanc-
ing .... 195
This argument assumes that elimination of a waiting period before a
curative statute became effective would lessen the standards of convey-
ancing and thwart the protective purposes of an acknowledgment; it
further assumes that a client should bear the cost of the errors committed
by his attorney.
With respect to the first point, it is far from established that immedi-
ate validity would make attorneys less careful or vigilant in preparing
conveyances. No attorney worthy of membership in the bar knowingly re-
leases an instrument he has prepared unless he believes it adequate and
correct for its purposes. In addition to ethical or professional considera-
tions, this is true for the practical reason that an instrument defectively
acknowledged would be rejected 'by the registrar to the embarrassment
and inconvenience of the attorney preparing it. Any errors that do ap-
pear are inadvertent, and it is unlikely that their number would diminish
by a curative statute of long duration. Furthermore, it would be sig-
nificant to learn whether most errors in acknowledgments appear in
conveyances prepared by attorneys or by laymen, and whether there has
been a general lessening of standards with respect to instruments of
conveyancing in states which make their validating statutes operative
immediately or after a short delay.196
Any loss resulting from a defective conveyance is suffered by the
client rather than by the attorney who supervised the transaction or the
registrar who examined the deed. Since the client is not culpable, he
ought not to bear the consequences of the error and, in all fairness to
him, the situation should be rectified as soon as possible by curative
legislation.
Concededly, the requirement of an acknowledgment for all convey-
requires extensive investigation to locate the parties for the purpose of procuring a
correction document. The time and effort involved is invariably costly. If it is impos-
sible to secure correction documents the situation may necessitate costly legal action
to clear a title.
New York State Legislative Annual 206 (1954).
195 Basye 338.




ances serves a valid social purpose: ".. . to make title secure and pre-
vent frauds in conveyancing as well as to furnish proof of the due
execution of conveyances."' 19 7 However, it is not the act of acknowledg-
ment itself which is of value; once performed, any clerical errors re-
sulting in the certificate of acknowledgment should not impeach it. In
addition, the advantages to the clearing of titles resulting from a curative
statute effective after a brief period would appear to be of greater social
value than those benefits resulting from postponement before a defect
is cured in hopes of uncovering any fraudulent transactions.
Considering the legitimate and valuable objectives which can be, and
have been in other states, accomplished by curative legislation, New
York has failed to avail itself of an important means by which problems
of conveyancing and marketability of title can be reduced. The present
curative acts are too narrow in scope and remedy defects after too long
a delay. Revision of these statutes to enlarge their ambit and shorten
the time in which they operate is desirable.
IV.
STANDARDS OF MARCETABLE TITLE
As the large volume of real estate transactions reveals, a significant
segment of our economy is devoted to the buying, selling and mortgag-
ing of property. 98 One can assume then that real estate values would
substantially decrease if marketability were not an incident of owner-
ship. Consequently, a purchaser of property is very much concerned
with whether his property can readily be sold or mortgaged, and a sys-
tem of conveyancing which fails to facilitate such matters is inadequate.
The actual transfer of property by deed is generally no problem. In
New York and many other jurisdictions the legislature has adopted
short forms of conveyances which may be used. 9 Printed copies thereof
may be purchased or secured gratis from the title companies, and the
forms are so simple that they can often be competently completed by
an experienced legal secretary. Why then are there so many problems
associated with the transfer of a parcel of property that title may not
close until a month or more after the signing of the contract of sale?
The answer to this question is, in great part, our Anglo-American concept
297 Merwin, I., in Armstrong v. Combs, 15 App. Div. 246, 249, 44 N.Y. Supp. 171, 173
(3d Dep't 1897).
198 E.g., the Register of the City of New York reports in a letter to the author dated
December 19, 1957, that the following numbers of instruments were recorded in the
counties of New York, Bronx, Kings and Queens during 1956: conveyances, 78,841;
mortgages, 85,021; miscellaneous instruments, 5,667 and satisfactions, 217,366.
199 N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 258. Use of these forms, however, is not mandatory.
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of marketable title which requires the seller to offer to the buyer a
marketable title.200 It is of prime importance, therefore, that the stand-
ards by which marketable title is determined be reasonable, definite and
easily ascertainable.
Historically, in courts of law there were only good and bad titles; a
person either owned or did not own the particular property in dispute.2 '
It was for equity to devise that twilight concept of marketable title in
order to permit a seller to obtain a decree of specific performance against
a reluctant buyer who had raised spurious objections to the seller's title;
and also to protect the same buyer from being compelled to accept a
conveyance of property, title to which, though vested in seller and con-
sidered good at law, was beclouded by certain defects. Even prior to
the merger of law and equity, courts of law in New York adopted the
concept of marketable title, °20 and today the courts of most jurisdictions
apply the doctrine. °3
As generally formulated, marketable title designates " ... a title not
necessarily perfect, or even good, in the law sense, but so free from all
fair and reasonable doubts that they (courts of equity) would compel
a purchaser to accept it in a suit for specific performance. '" 2°4 The pur-
port of marketable title as evolved by the courts of this state is in accord
with this definition. Based on various New York cases, Mr. Justice Ben-
venga of the New York supreme court has expressed the concept as
follows:205
... [a] marketable title is a good title, one that is free and clear from
encumbrances and encroachments or from material defects in the title,
one which it is reasonably certain will not be called into question; in short,
one which can be readily sold to a reasonable prudent purchaser or
mortgaged to a person of reasonable prudence as security for the loan of
money ... 206
As is frequently the case in the law, the articulation of a legal standard
200 Patton, Land Titles § 47 (1957); Friedman, Contracts and Conveyances of Real
Property § 21 (1954).
201 Patton, Land Titles § 46 (1957).
202 See Moore v. Williams, 115 N.Y. 586, 22 N.E. 233 (1889).
203 92 C.J.S. § 189, at 23.
204 See note 201 supra. See also definition in 4 American Law of Property § 18.7 (Casner
ed. 1952).
205 Pyramid Motor Freight Corp. v. Thorman Baum & Co., 114 N.Y.S.2d 614, 616
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1948).
206 But cf., Ossining Associates v. City of New York, 148 N.Y.S.2d 496, 499 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1955), in which Mr. Justice Valente states that "A true test of marketability
is whether the purchaser can use the property for its intended purposes." As applied to
the facts of the case, in which a contract vendee sought to recover his down-payment
alleging that certain building encroachments rendered title unmarketable, this definition was
appropriate since the plaintiff intended to demolish the building and construct new premises.
But what if the buyer's purposes are changed or he is required to sell the premises before
realizing them; he would be the owner of a parcel of property which would be unmarketable
to a future vendee except one who similarly intended to demolish the existing structure.
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is easier than its application. Attorneys can agree that a title afflicted
by reasonable doubt should not be foisted upon an unwilling buyer; but
what constitutes reasonable doubt in a particular situation is resolvable
too often only by litigation.
In addition to the attorney's concern that his client receive a title
secure from present controversy, he must also be alert to the possibility
that upon the sale of the same parcel of property the title examiner act-
ing for the future purchaser may arrive at a different conclusion as to
whether the title is free from a reasonable doubt. Consequently, an at-
torney may .be reluctant to approve a title which has even the most
insignificant defect since it may prove to be unsatisfactory to the next
examiner of title. The result of this system is that the practices of the
most conservative members of the title examining community become
its standard. In many areas "flyspecking" or construing against title
has become the norm, and acquisition of titles with remote contingencies
and defects is discouraged and the saleability of property impeded. °7
The obvious infirmities of this system of title examination08 demand
corrective action which will standardize title examination, thereby in-
creasing the ease of land transactions. A spontaneous movement has de-
veloped in the bar associations of various counties and states in an at-
tempt to provide a solution to this problem. These associations have
adopted uniform standards of marketable title to be used as guides by
title examiners in determining what presumptions of law and fact can
be indulged without fear of negligence, and to provide a common basis
upon which to measure the adequacy of a title. The distinction of de-
veloping the first title standard, in April of 1923, rests with the Liv-
ingston County Bar Association of Illinois.0 9 The State Bar Association
of Connecticut in 1938 adopted the first'set of standards to be used
uniformly throughbut any state. 10 As of 1953, standards of marketable
title had been recommended by seventeen state bar associations and
twenty-eight county or city associations."1' The midwest and mountain
207 See Payne, "Increasing Land Marketability Through Uniform Title Standards," 39
Va. L. Rev. 1, 9 (1953). In New York City the problem relevant to standards of market-
able title has in some measure been eliminated since a great many of the titles conveyed
are insured, in which event the contract of sale usually provides that the seller will deliver
such title as shall be accepted and insured by a named title insurance company.
208 The report submitted by the American Bar Association Committee on Substantive
Changes in Real Property Law contains the following appraisal of the conveyancing
system: "That the system fails to meet adequately the needs of present-day society permits
of little argument." Proceedings of the Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law
81, 82 (1948-49).
209 For a more complete discussion of the history of the title standard movement in
this country, see Payne, supra note 207, at 1.
210 12 Conn. B.J. 100 (1938).
211 Payne, supra note 207, at 20.
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states, areas in which neither title insurance nor title registration are in
common use, have tended to be the center of the movement.
Although adherence to title standards is for the most part voluntary,
some courts have taken judicial notice thereof. 12 Of course, the most
effective means of insuring their general usage is to have them enacted
into state law. Only Nebraska, as yet, has seen fit to adopt such legis-
lation.213
The Bar Association of Erie County was the first New York bar asso-
ciation to adopt standards for title examination. The Committee on
Practice of Real Estate Law prepared the standards which were adopted
by the directors of the Association on March 22, 1949. Several changes
and amendments were subsequently approved in 1954-1955. The pur-
poses of the standards are expressed by the Association in an introduc-
tory paragraph to the pamphlet in which they are published:
They [the standards] are not intended to establish a practice under
which unmarketable titles may be transferred without objection. Rather,
they are designed to establish a standard for the quantum of proof of
marketability and to some extent, the measure of quality of such proof.
If they provide a yardstick of uniform practice in this field, it is felt that
a useful purpose has been served.2 14
On September 2, 1955, the Executive Committee of the New York
State Bar Association approved and adopted twenty-five title stand-
ards.21 Since that date, these standards have been formally adopted
by the respective bar associations of Schenectady, Putnam, Richmond,
Jefferson, Madison and Wyoming counties.1 6
The similarity of ideas and identity of language in the Erie County
and New York State Bar Association standards cannot be explained by
mere coincidence. 17 One can assume that the Committee on Real Prop-
erty of the State Bar Association, which prepared the standards, either
was familiar with the Erie County standards or with a third source com-
mon to both. Neither set of standards is by any means complete s and
212 Grand Lodge A.O.U.W. v. Fischer, 70 S.D. 562, 21 N.W.2d 213 (1945).
213 Neb. Laws 1947, c. 249, § 1; now Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 76-601-644 (1943). See also
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 235.69 (1955) which establishes a standard of title solely with respect
to variance in names of parties.
214 See "Standards for Title Examination," published by the Bar Association of Erie
County (1955).
215 Ibid.
216 Letter dated November 13, 1957, from John F. Berry, Executive Secretary of the
State Bar Association addressed to author.
217 Four of the title standards are identical in language; those relating to: (1) presump-
tion of regularity of chancery action; (2) variation in corporate names; (3) clerical errors
appearing in discharge of mortgage; and (4) acknowledgments.
218 This is recognized by the New York State Bar Association which in the foreword
to its standards states that "The Committee further hopes that these standards will be added
to from time to time . .. ."
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many of the problems of the title examiner have not even been men-
tioned, such as the effect on marketability of unenforceable judgments,
the period of record search, questions of joint tenancy or tenancy by the
entirety, and the significance of ineffective restrictive covenants, to men-
tion only a few.
Another criticism that may be made of the New York standards is
that too many discuss only a single aspect of a title problem2 19 No
effort is made to dispose exhaustively of the variety of difficulties that
can arise in connection with any one general subject, such as corporate
conveyances or conveyances by and to trustees. In this connection,
the title standards adopted by the Bar Association of Michigan220 could
well serve as a model for completeness and organization. Ten general
classifications of title traps were established with specific standards
adopted for various particular matters that can arise under each cate-
gory.221 After the statement of a standard, its application is illustrated
by one or more problems, and, where available or appropriate, authorities
are cited or a comment inserted. Only an index and table of contents are
lacking to make these standards a valuable tool to the title examiner and
a genuine contribution to the law of conveyancing.
The value of title standards is illustrated by one reported decision in
which the question of a marketable title was litigated, and which might have
been avoided if the Bronx County Bar Association had in 1945 adopted
standard 10 of the New York State Bar Association.222 In Levitt v. 1317
Wilkins Corp.,,2 plaintiff sought to recover the sum of $1,000 paid to
defendant on signing of a contract to purchase a parcel of property.
He alleged that title thereto was not marketable because the deed to one
219 Payne, supra note 207, at 23, who, in reviewing and analyzing the standards adopted
throughout the country, concludes:
. .. [In general it can be said that none of the adoptions indicates a rational and
comprehensive functional attack upon the problems faced by the title examiner.
Without exception the standards represent piecemeal solutions of particular problems
brought to the attention of bar association committees by individual practitioners.
Moreover, many of the standards appear to have been drafted with the haste and
lack of attention that might be expected in the case of an expression of nonbinding
principles.
Prof. Payne further criticizes the title standard movement for failure of the state and county
bar associations to adopt mutually complementary standards rather than similar standards.
He suggests that the state standards be general propositions while the county standards
should be devised to meet special local situations. Those standards adopted in New York
by the state and county bar associations illustrate this failing, since no effort is made to
develop interrelated rather than identical state and local standards.
220 35 Mich. State B.J. 10 (August 1956).
221 E.g., there are thirty-one specific standards under the general rubric relating to
mortgages and mortgage foreclosures. Michigan Title Standards, c. 8, Standards 8.1-8.31.
222 This standard provides: "Corporate Names-Variations Objection: should not be made
where the name of a corporation appearing in the chain of title prior to the examination
date is substantially the same as the name appearing in the certificate of incorporation."
Standard VIII of the title standards of the Bar Association of Erie County is identical.
223 58 N.Y.S.2d 507 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1945).
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of the defendant's remote grantors erroneously referred to this grantor
as Greemont Realty Co., Inc., while the correct name of the grantor was
Greenmont Realty Co., Inc., by which name it had signed and ac-
knowledged its deed of transfer. The court held that this was not a suf-
ficient defect to taint the title as unmarketable. Countless similar dis-
putes might have been eliminated by reference to a title standard.
The use of title standards, therefore, can be of great assistance in
facilitating the transfer of land by eliminating concern with trivia and
matters of no real consequence. The efficacy of their use will be directly
related to: (1) the ability of the standards to achieve clarity of expres-
sion and a solution of the salient title problems of the community; and
(2) the support and enthusiasm provided by the local bar in adhering to
the voluntary standards. 24 Title standards will not cure all title prob-
lems; they are merely a technique by which marketability of title can
be simplified. This makes them worthy of the extended consideration
and cooperation of all lawyers and bar associations in the state.
Our present judicial concept of marketable title has been criticized
by some as negative, and it is suggested that to eliminate the present
confusion in title standards a more positive concept of marketability
must be devised.22 5 This argument is advanced: ". . . [I]n real estate
transactions we have in fact heretofore been primarily concerned with
unmarketability, not with marketability ... [and it is proposed that
marketability should] ...depend solely upon [the state of the rec-
ords] during some recent interval of time rather than upon their entire
history .... ))226
Advocates of such "modern marketability" applaud the pioneer en-
actment by Michigan in 1945227 of a marketable title statute which, in
addition to barring all claims and interests antedating a certain time,228
defines marketable title in terms of record title during a specified period
of time. The pertinent language of the statute is as follows:
Any person, having the legal capacity to own land in this state, who has
an unbroken chain of title of record to any interest in land for 40 years,
shall at the end of such period be deemed to have a marketable record title
to such interest, subject only to such claims thereto and defects of title as
224 Perhaps attorneys would be more inclined to cooperate with such standards if the
law provided that reliance thereon constitutes the exercise of due care in the examination
of titles. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-603 (1943), which enacts this principle.
225 See Basye §§ 371-74, at 539-48; Payne, "The Why, What and How of Uniform Title
Standards," 7 Ala. L. Rev. 25 (1954).
226 Basye 539.
227 Mich. Stat. Ann. § 26.1271 (1953). The following states subsequently enacted similar
legislation: Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-288 (1943); N-D. Rev. Code § 47-19A02 (1943); S.D.
Code § 51.16B01 (1939).
228 See p. 634 supra, for discussion of the limitation aspect of this statute.
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are not extinguished or barred by application of the provisions of succeed-
ing sections of this act and subject also to such interests and defects as are
inherent in the provisions and limitations contained in the muniments of
which such chain of record title is formed and which have been recorded
during said 40 year period: Provided, however, that no one shall be
deemed to have such a marketable record title by reason of the terms of
this act, if the land in which such interest exists is in the hostile possession
of another.229
Enthusiasm for the statute on the part of its votaries has been unlimited,
and one writer comments that:
., [I]t (the statute) is quite easy to understand and to apply. There
are no involved conditions or provisions to detract from its simplicity. The
tremendous impetus which this new method of evaluating marketability of
title promises to give to conveyancing procedure is obvious. It cuts loose
from all old norms of judging marketability and substitutes a system that
is efficient in practice and eminently fair in application .... m
There is a serious question whether this allegedly positive concept of
marketability really simplifies the task of the title examiner. Upon
searching a title, the examiner is faced with two questions: (1) For how
long a prior period should he investigate the record; and (2) what
notations appear of record during this period which adversely affect the
title?
With respect to the first question, undoubtedly, a limitation on the
period of search would be a great boon to title examination. But, such
a limitation can be made effective only by the statutory extinction of all
rights existing 'beyond the specified period; otherwise, the examiner is
obliged to search the records for the time interval during which any ad-
verse rights can possibly exist. The Michigan statute, however, excepts
various property interests from its purview so that a record search of
only forty years is incomplete and may not reveal all outstanding and
valid claims against the property.231 In addition, the statute does not
intend to impose a substantive limitation on property rights; rather it is
remedial and seeks to eliminate from the records worthless and invalid
claims which impair title 32
Moreover, the so-called positive concept of marketability gives the
title examiner no assistance on his second problem. He still has to
evaluate whether a particular state of facts renders the security of
ownership or possession so doubtful that the title is unmarketable. Dif-
ferences of opinion arising from this evaluation produce the vast number
of cases in which the question of marketable title is litigated. Un-
229 Mich. Stat. Ann. § 26.1271 (1953).
230 Basye 546.
231 See note 131 supra and accompanying text.
232 Michigan Title Standards, Standard 1.1.
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fortunately, the Michigan statute does not assist the title examiner in
this respect, and he must rely on reported decisions, title standards, and
his own views, to determine the impact on title of the myriad situations
that can plague it.233 Marketability of title is a concept similar in a
sense to health or justice; their absence is readily apparent, but their
essence escapes verbal encasement.2 34  Ultimately, reasonableness in
view of the particular facts will control marketability rather than any
mechanical definition. In the words of Mr. Justice Cardozo:
There is in all such controversies a penumbra where rigid formulas must
fail. No test more definite can then be found than the discretion of the
court, "to be carefully and guardedly exercised" . . . in furtherance ofjustice. In the exercise of that discretion, we declare this title unmarket-
able; the doubt too unsubstantial to place the purchaser in peril.23,5
CONCLUSION
Review of the law of conveyancing in New York indicates that much
can be done to improve the present system. Reform as to extinction
of stale land claims, broader curative legislation, and more comprehen-
sive and problem solving standards of marketable title, are the primary
areas in which legislation is needed. New York has been less creative
and progressive than other states in attempting to deal with the im-
portant question of title transfers. There is no reason why action should
be delayed any longer. The state legislature, assisted by bar associa-
tions, must be urged to begin a program of study and research by which
the necessary legislation can be drafted. We have had adequate ex-
perience with the present system to profit from its shortcomings and
to have been motivated to provide a remedy. The law of conveyancing
is too vital to our welfare to be further ignored.*
233 E.g., Lynbrook Gardens, Inc. v. Ullmann, 291 N.Y. 472, 53 N.E.2d 353, 152 A.L.R.
959 (1943) (seller claimed title under a statute the constitutionality of which is being
contested); Samuelson v. Glickman, 113 App. Div. 654, 99 N.Y. Supp. 886 (2d Dep't 1906)
(title subject to a party wall agreement).
234 It appears that the negative concept of marketability cannot be avoided even by
those who desire to think positively. See Payne, supra note 219, who makes the following
comment about any suggested definition of marketable title: "Such a definition should con-
tain a forceful statement to the effect that the only defects of record which should be
considered material are those which create a substantial danger of adverse attack."
235 Norwegian E. F. Church v. Milhauser, 252 N.Y. 186, 191, 169 N.E. 134, 135 (1929).
* AnDmua: Since this article was written, the New York State legislature has enacted
Chapters 863, 864, 865 and 866 of the Laws of 1958, which add five new sections to the
Real Property Law. In substance, these sections provide as follows:
Section 345:-Conditions subsequent or special limitations restricting the use of land and
rights of entry, or possibilities of reverter created thereunder, are extinguished and become
unenforceable unless a declaration of intention, which complies with the requirements set
forth in this section, is recorded not less than twenty-seven years nor more than thirty
years after such condition or limitation was created, and unless a renewal declaration has
been recorded after the expiration of nine years and before the expiration of ten years
from the date of recording the initial or the last renewal declaration. Timely recording
of such a declaration, entitled "Declaration of Intention to Preserve Restrictions on the
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Use of Land," is required despite the fact that: (a) the person obliged to record may be
subject to a disability such as infancy or incompetency; (b) or may have no knowledge
of such restriction; (c) or an action to determine the validity of such a restriction may
be pending; (d) or the existence of a judicial determination as to the validity of such
restriction may have been entered.
The section does not apply where such restrictions were created in favor of the United
States, the State of New York, or any governmental subdivision or agency thereof; the
owner of a reversion following an estate for life; the owner of a reversion following an
estate for years where the number of years of such estate wili expire less than seventy
years after the time required for recording of an initial declaration; the owner of a reversion
on a lease of communication, transportation or transmission lines; a mortgagee or contractor-
vendor of land, or the holder of any other security interest in land. In addition, this
section does not apply in the event that a person required to file the statutory declaration
has legally entered into possession of the land pursuant to a breach of any condition
restricting its use or shall have obtained a judgment for the recovery of such land prior to
the time specified for recording the required declaration. Limitations restricting the use of
land are not extinguished by this section if such limitations are imposed by covenant,
promise or negative easement, or if the right of entry or possibility of reverter is conditioned
upon some event other than breach of a restriction on the use of such land.
Section 346:-No restriction on the use of land created by covenant, promise or negative
easement or created on or after September 1, 1958, shall be enforced by injunction or
judgment compelling the conveyance of the land so burdened if it appears that the restric-
tion which was sought to be enforced is of no actual or substantial benefit to the person
seeking its enforcement. When affirmative relief against such restriction is sought in an
action to quiet title or otherwise, or relief is sought by way of defense or counterclaim
in an action to enforce the restriction, if the court finds that such restriction is of no
actual or substantial benefit to the person seeking its enforcement, it may determine that
the restriction is not enforceable and shall adjudge that it shall be completely extinguished
upon payment to the person who would otherwise be entitled to enforce it, in the event
of a breach, of damages if any are sustained.
Section 347:-No possibility of reverter or right of entry created in a special limitation
or condition subsequent on or after September 1, 1958, shall accrue by reason of a breach
thereof, but upon the happening of such a breach the person who would have the right to
enforce such possessory estate or right of entry may maintain an action in the supreme
court to compel a conveyance of the property subject to such limitation. The relief provided
by this section is to be granted only to protect a substantial interest in enforcement of
such restrictions. The court may deny such relief or impose conditions on the granting
thereof; or if it appears that granting such relief would be inequitable, the court may, in
lieu thereof, restrain the repetition of such a breach or provide the relief requested upon
such terms as to avoid unjust enrichment. This section does not apply to conveyances
containing special limitations or conditions subsequent for benevolent, charitable, educational,
public or religious purposes, which restrict the use of land to such purposes, or were created
by a lease for a term of less than one hundred years, and restrict the use of the leased
premises.
Section 348:-This section applies to special limitations or conditions subsequent created
prior to September 1, 1958, and provides that the owners of an estate subject to such a
limitation may maintain an action to obtain a judgment that such limitation is governed
by Sections 346 and 347. The court may grant the relief requested if it finds that the
primary purpose of the limitation or condition subsequent was to restrict the use of the
land and that such restriction unreasonably limits the use and development of the land
or unreasonably impairs the certainty of titles. In the event that a breach of the restriction
has already occurred at the time such an action is brought, the court shall not grant the
relief sought; however, if such relief is denied for this reason, unless the right of entry or
possibility of reverter is asserted by the owner thereof in that action or in another action
commenced within six months from the entry of judgment therein, such right of entry or
possibility of reverter shall be extinguished as against those persons or their successors who
are parties to the action.
Section 349:-Where land is held for benevolent, charitable, educational, public or religious
purposes and the use of such land is restricted to such purposes by a special limitation or
condition subsequent, an action may be brought in the supreme court to obtain relief
from such restriction, provided two years have elapsed from the creation of such limitation
or condition subsequent. The Attorney General shall be a party to such an action and
the court in determining whether such relief shall be granted shall consider and make
findings as to whether the primary purpose of the restriction was to limit the use of the
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land; or whether the purpose of the restriction was to insure that the substantial value of
the land rather than the land itself be devoted to benevolent, charitable, educational, public
or religious purposes; or whether the restriction is substantially impeding the owner of the
land in furtherance of its use for such purposes; or whether the person who would have
the right of entry or possibility of reverter will suffer substantial damage by reason of its
extinguishment or modification. The court is granted discretion to discharge or modify the
restriction or to award damages for any injuries sustained as a result of such extinguishment
or modification, or direct that the land may be conveyed, leased or mortgaged free of such
restriction, and its judgment may contain any other provision as equity may require. The
section does not apply to a right of entry or possibility of reverter which has accrued prior
to September 1, 1958, or where the conveyance creating the restriction was made with or
by the United States, State of New York or any governmental subdivision or agency thereof.
This legislation is salutary and should do much to eliminate one of the major title
problems-possibilities of reverter and rights of entry-and make marketable titles which
formerly suffered from such defects. In addition, properties which have not been developed
because of uncertainties of title resulting from such restrictions may now be put to better
economic use.
